Blog 93 - 'Tween Decks and Hydraulic Leaks - Oil in Boiler - A Hypothesis for a Sinking

“Marine Musings 28” - “Bibi” - 6th April 1994 to 25th July 1994

(Possibly this is the Bibi)

In response to my Blog 92 - "Atlantic Erie - my good friend and colleague, Mani Lakshmanan, reminded (and corrected) me that the Outer Loop Belt width was 102" and the Inner Loop Belt width was 108" on the two Vulica Self Unloaders. He had been the 'permanent' Chief Engineer for both the Vulica ships, the 'Bernardo Quintana' and the 'Blount' and had sailed on them for many years prior his retirement.

On my two previous ships, both Self Unloaders, I had done only 3 month stretches. In the first case, I was sacked and in the second case I left by choice, as serving on Self Unloaders was not gainful to me.

Due to other extraneous circumstances - I have no memory of the circumstances - I served on the “Bibi” for a little over 3 ½ months only.

The “Bibi’ was owned by Linea Mexicana and managed by Barber New Orleans.

A sister ship of the “Bibi” was being managed by the Mexicans themselves.

In effect, BSM New Orleans Management was being compared on a daily basis with that of the Mexican Management.

Both ships were on the same run in opposite directions - we would cross each other somewhere in the Atlantic.

The run was - 3 ports in Mexico, Houston, Galveston, (sometimes New Orleans), Tampa, Miami, then several European ports in the Mediterranean - Italy, France and Spain.

The “Bibi’ was, basically, a General Cargo ship, with facility for carrying containers on deck, with more emphasis on reefer containers. The construction was more or less typical of a General Cargo Ship - Upper ‘Tween Deck, Lower ‘Tween Deck, Lower Hold - with hydraulically operated McGregor hatch covers at each level.

Ports were easy paced, typical of General Cargo ships.

A little too typical, as I was to find out for myself within a week.

At every stage, a lot of dunnage would be used and also a lot of wood for supports to prevent shifting of cargo.

The main deck was the weather deck.

Having joined at Houston, I found myself to be very busy in the Engine Room till we left Miami for a trans-Atlantic voyage.

The first such day, I went inspecting all the deck machinery. My concern was the neglect of oil leaks in the hydraulic machinery.

The second day, I went to have a look at the hydraulics for the ‘tween hatches.

I entered the under deck spaces through a water tight door connected to the Engine Room and I slowly made my way forward.

After I passed two holds, I was uneasy about the open watertight doors between holds. To check, I proceeded further into the portside and came around all the way round the starboard side.

I went straight up to the Bridge and asked the Captain to accompany me on the same route I had traversed a few minutes earlier. I did not comment and just allowed him to follow my lead.

It was after a few minutes that the Captain suddenly stopped and asked “Why are these watertight doors open?”

A dressing down of the Deck Officers and crew took place, with instructions to check and shut / dog down all watertight doors prior departure any port.

Apparently, they were never kept shut.

I mention this a little elaborately as it has a bearing on events to follow.

I was also unhappy with the numerous oil leaks from the hydraulics in the ‘tween deck spaces. The ship had been with BSM NOLA for over 8 months and, according to the Chief Officer, nobody had bothered.

Neither had the Chief Officer for that matter, knowingly allowing water tight doors to be kept open at sea and also allowing hydraulic oil - from leaks - to accumulate in the ‘tween deck spaces and on deck.

We had an extra Fourth Engineer who was keeping watch with Second Engineer. The Second was, anyway, not going down at 4am to take over watch and would languidly spend 2 or 3 hours in the Engine Room in the mornings and 2 hours in the evenings, till 6pm.

I told the Second that "Anyway, you are not keeping watch. I am taking you off watch at sea, so that you can concentrate on rectifying oil leaks, first in the ‘tween deck area and then on the main deck". A time limit of one month was set, even if the Second had to work 16 hours a day to complete the job. A check revealed sufficient O rings and seal rings were available, suggesting somebody had taken the trouble to requisition the required spares, without carrying out the actual job.

I got the Chief Officer to clean out all the leakage oil - several 200L drums of it - and ensure the areas were kept clean.

The Engine Room staff were happily paying no attention to leaks of oil, water, steam in the Engine Room.

Oil in the Cascade Tank

Most disturbing was the presence of fuel oil in the Cascade Tank, indicating one or more steam coils in the fuel oil tanks were leaking.

Suddenly, the Engine Room and the Deck became a beehive of activity.

Boiler water and condensate water condition came under the purview of the Third Engineer and he had been neglecting his job. Once reprimanded, he then spent a lot of his hours in the bilges for the next few days, determining which steam coil was leaking, under my guidance. It was located and blanked. Luckily, all Fuel Oil Tanks had two heating coils, so the heating of fuel oil was not affected.

When I asked him about any fuel oil contamination of the boiler water, he told me the boiler water was fine, but I did not believe him. Using filter paper, the boiler water was tested under my eyes - there was a residue of fuel oil in the filter paper.

At an opportune moment, when we could de-pressurise the boiler, we inspected the internals. Quite a thick layer of oil was found on the surface of the water which we could, literally, scoop up in buckets. Using the suction side of a small pump as a vacuum cleaner, we managed to take away more than 95% of the oil residue. Using Gamlen chemicals, we heated the water to approach a condition which we could call ‘reasonably clean’.

But the bottom (6” dia) inspection holes, 4 in number, proved to be a tough nut. Some of the floating fuel oil had coagulated and had sunk between the inner walls of the boiler shell and the outer walls of the furnace. It had, over the years, turned into a thick, tarry residue. It took us the better part of 2 days to clean 80% of this. We could not reach the rest of it.

That Third Engineer and that Second Engineer would probably, in later years, have made a beeline straight for the Boiler System and Hydraulic oil leaks on joining their later ships.

Pure neglect.

The Loss of our sister ship, being run by the Mexicans:

Nearing the end of my second month on board, we were informed by New Orleans that the sister ship that was on the same run, operated by the Mexicans, had sunk with all hands on board in a storm in the Atlantic. It was a numbing shock to all of us.

A few days later, a few details emerged that they had lost all power during the storm after they were unable to start the generators, these having failed one after the other. These were the last few messages received from the vessel before the last one, which stated ‘cargo loose, striking and causing holes shipside, sinking fast’. An ‘SOS’ had been sent.

We were asked if we could throw some light on why she sank so fast, without any time for the people to abandon ship. We were asked to keep in touch with the Mexican Superintendents also, if we had anything to say.

After a couple of days of mulling over why all three generators would fail at a crucial time, I asked a question “Did she bunker diesel oil in Miami recently?”

Not so surprisingly, back came the reply along with a question.

“Yes, the vessel had bunkered about 90 tonnes of Diesel Oil and 1000 tonnes of Fuel Oil in Miami. Why do you ask?”

Here I have to elaborate a few things in order for the reader to form a clear picture.

In many of the ports in the US, the bunkers of Fuel Oil and Diesel Oil comes in a barge, pushed by a tug boat. After the barge ties up to the ship, the tug boat leaves and would return only after the bunkers are completed.

This barge normally has only one man on board, who attends to all the duties and the work.

He powers up a small diesel generator that supplies power to several pumps and some navigational lights.

A hydraulic pump runs a crane that lifts the bunker hose to the ship. Unlike in other countries, the securing of this bunker hose to the ship’s system has to be done by the ship’s crew. In other countries, the bunker barge personnel climb on board, using either a Pilot’s Ladder or a Jacob’s Ladder and secure their pipeline to the ship’s pipelines.

Meanwhile, one or two of the ship’s personnel climb down to the barge to check the soundings and quantities of each tank on the barge.

In other countries, the ship’s staff are not allowed to take their own samples from the barge tanks and will have to, compulsorily, accept the samples that are taken by them. It is only after the year 2000, with stricter application of ISO 9000 standards, that the bunker barge staff had to take the samples in plain sight of the ship’s staff.

In the US, the lone barge attendant is normally very expansive and cheerful and allows the taking of samples directly from the barge tanks, freely.

On our last call to Miami, we were to bunker both, Fuel Oil and Diesel Oil.

My instructions to the Fourth Engineer, who goes down to the barge to record the soundings of all barge tanks, also consisted of a small peculiarity - a near phobia - of mine.

When taking the ullage or sounding of the Diesel Oil tank, I would remind the Fourth Engineer - I would be standing on the deck of my ship, looking down at the barge - to wipe a small quantity of Diesel Oil off the bob of the sounding tape and smear it on the back of his palm. When he does that, I would ask him if it burns.

In the 1980s and 1990s, possibly even after that, there were a group of unscrupulous people around the world, who would take the waste acids away from industries as authorised agents for the disposal of those acids in a recognised manner. They would always take away more than what their disposal plant can handle.

As the waste acid quantities built up in their storage facilities, they would bribe some people in the oil terminals and pump the waste acids into the large diesel oil tanks, where the acid and the diesel oil would mix well.

This diesel oil, if supplied to ships, can cause havoc, even if the percentage of acid in the diesel oil is small.

During those decades, some of the larger - and cheaper - bunkering ports around the world were notorious for this.

To find this mixing before the diesel oil is bunkered is extremely difficult. Even laboratory analysis has to be very deep and thorough to find the acids.

But, the smallest of quantities of acid in the diesel oil will burn the skin - lightly or heavily, depending on the concentration - on the back of the palm.

Before bunkering, this ‘drop-on-skin’ test is practically the only way to find out diesel oil contaminated with acids. The higher the concentration, the more severe the burn. Smell is another small giveaway.

The Fourth Engineer signalled a light burning sensation, so I went down to the barge to check. Yes, there was a slight burning sensation.

I told the barge operator we will not be taking the diesel oil. He said’ fine’, as it made no difference to him. He also allowed me to take two samples of this possibly-contaminated-diesel-oil for the vessel’s retention.

I informed all concerned that I am refusing diesel oil due to possible contamination, but did not mention ‘acid contamination’.

Luckily, we had sufficient quantities of diesel oil in stock to last us quite a while.

A Hypothetical Case

One would ask - what is the harm in bunkering diesel oil which is slightly contaminated with acid?

On this ship, the generators were permanently running on diesel oil. The Main Engine was always on Fuel Oil.

Acids cannot be separated by the purifiers and will remain mixed with the Diesel Oil.

Acid contamination attacks the most vulnerable part of the engine - in this case the highly polished surface of the fuel pump plunger and barrel, which has very, very fine tolerances. Over a period of just a few hours, this corrosive acid causes pitting on the plunger and barrel, causing it to slowly lose its pumping ability.

Lesser and lesser fuel, then, goes into the engine and the rpm drops. To compensate, the governor increases the fuel. More pitting takes place and a cannibalistic cycle is instituted, till the governor is unable to cope, the engine slows down, the ‘low frequency’ and ‘low voltage’ trips are activated and the engine comes to a stop.

A black out takes place.

By then, being a ‘manual’ ship, there is panic all round. The engineers start the next generator and since the same contaminated diesel oil is being used, the second generator also faces the same breakdown within a short while.

Since no particular cause has been found for the stoppage of any generator, the third one is started and, in a couple of hours, everything comes to a standstill.

There is no power on the ship for propulsion. The Emergency Generator kicks in to supply power to emergency circuits, including GMDSS, some lighting.

As it is extremely unlikely that this sudden breakdown has been diagnosed to have been caused by acidic contamination in the fuel the engineers keep trying to start any generator.

Trying to start any main generator is unsuccessful, as the fuel pumps are not pumping fuel to the fuel injectors. Meanwhile, the compressed air in the air bottles is getting depleted and the bottle becomes empty, with no chance to fill it up, unless an air compressor is connected to the emergency switchboard.

Meanwhile the weather has worsened.

The cargo in the lower holds - on the sister ship - were steel sheet coils, each weighing more than 3 tons. We also carried the same cargo on every trip.

Due to the rolling and pitching, this cargo shifts, gets loose, breaks its securing wires, rolls about and slams into the ship side.

It is now only a matter of time before this creates a hole in the ship’s side.

Water starts pouring into the hold and the level increases.

As I had found on our ship, the ‘Bibi’, the booby hatches from the Lower ‘Tween Deck to the Lower Hold had, possibly, not been closed for a sea passage, as found on the ‘Bibi’ on my first voyage.

Water comes into the Lower ‘Tween Deck spaces.

Now, as I had first noticed on the ‘Bibi’, the watertight doors in the underdeck spaces could possibly have been kept open and not been dogged down for a sea passage.

Water flows from one compartment to the other freely.

The ship’s side holes must have been quite a few for the water to have ingressed so fast, fast enough not even to give time for launching lifeboats.

Several actions, with quick responses, could have saved the ship.

First, a quick comprehension that all the fuel pumps are not able to pump the diesel oil and immediately suspect the diesel oil. (The probability that all 6 fuel pumps will fail at the same time is very, very, small).

When so suspected, feed the generator with diesel oil from a different tank, bunkered at a different source.

Secondly, the booby hatches in the ‘Tween Deck spaces should have been kept closed.

Thirdly, the water tight doors in the under deck spaces should have been closed.

A tragic end to 35 crew.

My speculative and hypothetical scenario went out.

I do not know how it was received and what happened later, as I had signed off two weeks later.

Courtesy Pinterest

Actually, it was a pretty interesting run, with good ports being visited.

Palermo

Naples

Genoa

Nice

Marseille

Barcelona

Valencia

Algeciras

Gibraltar

For once, I did not have any run-in with the Office and had a smooth tenure.

I would like to think that I achieved my self-assigned goal of improving operational and maintenance conditions by at least 10% during my tenure, the goal having been a part of me for a long time.

Before joining the "Bibi", as per quality protocols, I had to fly to New Orleans for a 'briefing'.

During the briefing, the daily meeting of all Superintendents, the General Manager and some of the office assistants was taking place.

I was invited to join the meeting.

The first half an hour to forty minutes went into each Superintendent going into the issues on his ship and what was being done about them. Some of the comments were boastful with "I did this" and "I did that" whereas, to my mind, the work was being done by the ship, but the credit went to the respective Superintendent.

The meeting was about to close when the GM asked me if I wanted to say anything.

I had had a pet grouse for a few years that the vessels were not being given due importance from shore based establishments, with the Office taking centre stage.

Willing to speak up, I went to the book shelf and pulled out the "Instructions to Ships" manual and, searching for what I wanted, displayed a diagram therein.

The diagram showed 'Superintendent' at the centre of a circle, with radii to various establishments - Owner, Ship's Chandler, Workshop, Classification Society, Agents, Charterers etc and, finally, 'Ship'.

I pointed out that the ship was relegated to the periphery of the circle and was not given its rightful place, the centre, which showed the bias and the administrative authority of the establishment.

I told them that by assigning the ship to one of the radii, they were making a mistake. It was the ship that generated the funds needed for all the others to survive and was not an ancillary, as depicted.

I don't think it went down too well. The only comment came from the GM who said, as I said goodbye, "Looks like you have taken them down a notch or two".

As I left within the hour to join the ship at Houston, I was unable to gauge the reaction of others.

===== "Marine Musings 29" Continues =====