BLOG 77 - 'Nosac Tai Shan" - Stresses on Ship's Staff Arrival / Departure Port - A Pilot Error

"Marine Musings 20" - Nosac Tai Shan - Maiden Voyage

Chapter 7

US AND EUROPEAN PORTS

As usual, it was a mad scramble in all US Ports, starting from the Western Seaboard, crossing the Panama Canal and going up the eastern seaboard. 6 to 8 hour stays in every port.

Then across the Atlantic to European ports.

Europe was a madhouse. Short runs between ports, long pilotages up or down river, short stays of just a few hours, docking and undocking at any time of day and night with reduced crew meant sleep deprived staff.

Le Havre, Zeebrugge, Antwerp, Rotterdam, Bremerhaven and Gothenburg were some of the ports we called during that voyage.

The routines of coming into port and leaving port may be considered routine by some, but it was deadly, as it constituted one of the many periods of time when the vessel is most vulnerable and can be prone to accidents if the staff on board are not alert.

Vessels are most vulnerable when

1. Docking, Coming alongside a berth. It requires the coordinated cohesion of multiple, disparate parties for an accident free operation. Tugs, line handlers, Pilot, Master, Officer on Duty, Helmsman, responses from the Main Engine and Engineers, responses from the Bow Thruster and a myriad of things that needed to go right.

2. Undocking or leaving a berth, a port. Ditto as above. It sometimes includes turning the ship around by 180 degrees in a very tight space.

3. Close quarter navigation in heavy density traffic areas, where you have to keep a watch on all ships around you.

4. Navigating during bad weather, storms, heavy fog.

5. Navigating through charted narrow and deep channels, with shallow water and shoals in close proximity.

6. Bunkering.

For ships on a Liner Service, the only respite, relatively, that seafarers get is when the ship is crossing oceans as, most of the time, you work only certain hours. Once the ship is in the US or Europe, practically all staff are reduced to automatons, with the sheer number of ports that the vessel calls. Everyone wants their cargo delivered at their doorsteps, like UPS or Amazon or Flipkart deliveries.

Europe is in a class by itself as far as pressure on the seafarer is concerned, due to the proximity of ports of different nations - meaning short sea passages through heavy traffic zones, long pilotages of 8 to 16 hours up or down river - meaning personnel needing to be alert at stations, especially on the Bridge and the Engine Room, short stays in port - meaning 3 to 6 hours of cargo work and no time to sleep, and out again on pilotage down river at which time the Bridge and Engine Room are fully manned.

On those Liner Vessels, during calls at European Ports, the Captain has the worst of it and does not get any rest.

Dense traffic means he has to be up on the Bridge.

Fog means he has to be up on the Bridge.

Bad weather means he has to be up on the Bridge.

Navigating in proximity to the coast or shallow waters means he has to be up on the Bridge.

Pilot on board means he has to be up on the Bridge.

When the vessel is berthing or unbething, he has to be up on the Bridge.

It is only during the 4~8 watch that he has the opportunity to have an uneasy nap, that too provided he has a trustworthy and experienced Chief Mate.

After berthing, he has to be in the Ship’s Office, dealing with Health officials, Immigration officials, Customs officials and the vessel’s agents. In the days of yore, all the paper work involved was done by a Purser till he became a distant memory; in later years by the Radio Officer till he also disappeared from the scene.

Any disputes, any administrative problems - all were his to solve, within the few hours available.

The vessel schedules were normally to sail after 3 or 4 hours, after discharging 200 cars and loading 200 cars.

His was the toughest job on board.

As Chief Engineer, I would be called at ‘1 hour notice’ and would join the Duty Engineer and the Duty Motorman in the Engine Room within 15 minutes. The maximum hours of sleep I would have gotten was 2 to 3 hours, before being woken up. The Electrical Officer and I would be the maximum affected as we both have to be in the Control Room. The Second and Third Engineers would relieve one another.

The Main Engine would be on ‘Bridge Control’, but I would be keenly watching to see if all the sequences were taking place as programmed, something akin to the Director of Operations at NASA during a launch.

One of my core duties is to ensure that the Engine is not stressed at any time. The most prominent of these stresses are Heat Stresses caused by a sudden decrease or increase in operating temperatures. Modern metallurgy has improved to a point where materials operating at high temperatures are resilient to a certain degree. But if subjected to frequent steep temperature gradients, they are likely to crack, much like a human mind under strong, frequent stresses.

Without going into too much detail, suffice it to say that speed reduction, in small steps, from full speed to manoeuvring speed is one of the essential operations to minimise heat stresses. It was important for me to remotely watch this reduction of speed by the Bridge operator and, if necessary, correct the rate of reduction by taking over controls from the Bridge to Engine Control Room.

This ship was captained by a top class Captain, who understood well the nuances of operating the Main Engine. But I have sailed with mavericks who used to think of the engine as a horse and, when going at full speed, pull hard on the reins to stop the horse. Maybe they were under the impression that, as the Main Engine power is expressed in “horse power”, it is actually a horse.

Those were the days when I used to walk straight up to the Bridge and, after ascertaining that there was no emergency, would quietly tell the Captain that if the same thing happens again, I will have to take controls back to the Control Room. The explanation from them would be that the previous Chief Engineer had no problems with such speed reductions. (I would have just joined the ship). Then I would take the opportunity to explain to him in detail why it was harmful to the Main Engine.

In fact, when Barber Ship Management had a “Newsletter” running, to which I contributed an article on cracks on cylinder heads and liners due to bad, indifferent, negligent, manoeuvering practices, with statistics. After that article was published, I had a few Captains chiding me in a friendly manner and saying “Bada Saab, your article is being waved in front of my face with the comment ‘See, Bada Saab Ranganathan has written this’”.

Apart from watching the changing parameters closely to detect any anomalies, I would ensure that standby generators are started a few minutes before they were actually required, air bottles are kept pressed up well in advance of expected movements, switch on the power and remind the Bridge to start the Bow Thruster a few minutes early to warm up the motor, ensure power is switched on for winches and windlass, adjust cylinder lubrication as needed and do a host of other things, all from a mental checklist.

Later, I made check lists, printed them and kept them for all to use.

Chapter 8 - Antwerp Antics

One can prepare for everything and still be surprised by events.

We were entering Antwerp around midnight+. To get to the berth, we have to go through one of the two locks and berth close to the locks, upriver. I am not certain if we were going to discharge or load or both.

We were well outside the locks. Captain Abraham was on the Bridge, along with other watchkeepers. I was in the Engine Control Room, along with duty Engineers and a Greaser.

The Bow Thruster was running and in use. All 3 generators were running, which is normal when using the Bow Thruster. I was watching all the parameters.

We were on Bridge Control. A ‘Full Astern’ movement was given. Less than a minute into the ‘Astern’ movement, I heard the ‘humming’ sound of the Engine change to one of strain. I looked at the Load Indicator and realised that the Engine Load had gone up by more than 70%. The engine was straining to give the required rpm and the Fuel Index was increasing more and more. A ‘Stop’ signal stopped the engine.

The changes in parameters had taken place in the space of 30 seconds.

Berendrecht Lock (right) and Zandvliet Lock (left), located at the entrance to the Port of Antwerp (top) from the Scheldt (foreground)

My first thought was that we had run aground. I called the Bridge.

I was told that we were in the locks. I went up to the Bridge and spoke to Captain Abraham about the rapid and sudden change in parameters at exactly a particular minute and second. Since we had not run aground, I stated that I suspect propeller damage.

He said that, due to a wrong ‘Astern’ movement from the Pilot, the vessel may have struck a navigational buoy, as he had seen it drifting away.

Then the Agent, who was at the pier waiting for the ship to berth, was contacted for an immediate inspection of the propeller by an authorised diver.

In the meantime, I quickly called all Engine Room personnel and formulated a check list of all important inspections to be made of the Main Engine, in the short time available alongside.

The inspections included

If turning gear motor amps had increased

Thrust Block inspection

Bearing clearances

Any longitudinal shift of shaft

Chain inspection

If possible, crank web deflections

Air Coolers Check

The sound from the turbochargers had already been checked, found no undue vibrations, oil levels of the BBC Turbochargers’ sumps all good, LO pumps good.

I had a 'Check Main Engine Fuel Pumps' Timing' on my list, but did not have the time to check it.

We had less than three hours to carry out umpteen number of checks.

In the meantime, the diver had come up and he reported that all was fine with the propeller. I asked him how many blades he had checked. He said he had checked four blades. I took him down to the Engine Control Room and asked him again if he had checked properly and was he sure there was no damage. His reply made me lose my temper. He had said, with a very racist sneer, “ Chief, if you had wanted me to give a ‘damaged propeller’ report, you should have told me before I went down”. I was furious. I then showed him the propeller drawing that this was a 5 bladed propeller. He had already typed out his report but he had not mentioned the number of blades. He quickly changed his previous verbal statement that he had checked 4 blades and corrected it to 5.

I refused to sign the report and told him to get out of the ship. Apparently, he went to the Agent, who signed the report and handed it over to the Captain.

By then cargo had been completed, we picked up the ramp and went out through the locks.

As we went to ‘Slow Ahead’, I noticed that the Load Indicator showed 30% more than normal. On reaching ‘Half Ahead’, the Load was 60% more than normal. ‘Full Ahead’ showed about 80% increase in load, along with a ‘thwack, thwack’ coming from the stern tube and heavy vibrations of the engine and hull.

We reduced to slightly less than ‘Half Ahead’, so that the noise reduced and the vibrations were tolerably less. We changed Engine Controls to Control Room and tried to increase speed, with the same result. We even changed to Emergency Local controls - where the pneumatics and hydraulics were cut out and controls reverted to pre-automated days (like I had on the “Chennai” ships) - and tried, all to no avail.

If we were to keep the schedule, we would not be able to sustain running at this low an rpm for long.

I drafted a message to be sent to the HongKong Office. The Superintendent was different from the one I had a verbal fight with. We called them on the ‘Inmarsat’ after a few minutes. They said they were assembling a team at the conference table and would call back.

What did Happen on the Bridge?

While waiting for them to call back, Captain Abraham gave me a step-by-step account of the incident when the buoy was found drifting away.

He and the Pilot were on the Bridge Wing, with the vessel being aligned for entry into the locks. Because of the span or beam from Bridge to Bridge wing being large, the Captain always used the handheld radio to communicate with the Duty Officer, to pass on the Pilot’s instructions, either for Engine Telegraph orders or Helm orders, the Duty Officer at the Engine telegraph and the duty AB at the wheel.

On this ship, like most Car Carriers, the Bridge was right forward, so you had to go out on the wings to see astern. Unlike on other ships having the Bridge near the stern and above the Engine Room, one cannot hear or feel an engine start, unless one is watching the rpm indicator closely.

The Pilot wanted a ‘Full Astern’ movement.

Being a ‘Right Handed’ ship, with an astern movement, the bow tends to swing to starboard. (A link to a brief but interesting video is below).

https://youtu.be/y7-tUlxr_no

Seeing a buoy very close to the ship on the port quarter, the Captain refused to order an 'astern' movement on the radio and told the Pilot that the request for “Full Astern” will be given once the vessel clears the buoy. The Pilot, probably with racial prejudice, started screaming at the Captain, shouting “Full Astern” “Full Astern”, whereas the Captain was calmly telling him “There is no cause for alarm. You will get the astern movement after we clear the buoy”.

The Pilot shouted even louder “Full Astern”.

The Duty Officer heard it and, thinking it was legitimate, gave the “Full Astern” movement.

About 30 or 40 seconds later, feeling a bit of vibration - an ‘astern’ movement is always accompanied by vibrations - the Captain saw the vessel starting to swing to starboard and, looking up at the rpm indicator on the Bridge Wing, realised the Main Engine was running on ‘Astern’, called for it to be stopped.

Looking astern, he saw the buoy drifting away.

The rotating propeller had cut the anchor chain of the buoy, damaging itself.

===== Continued in Blog 78 =====