BLOG 58 - Bunkering Frauds - Consequences - 'Tadano' Cranes - Friends in Kuwait City

Foreword : A rather upsetting trend that I am coming across over the past year or so is on You Tube. Quite a number of present seafarers are posting vlogs mainly elaborating the various salaries that can be earned, with emphasis on earnings of top ranks in foreign companies ($10,000 to 12,000 per month), showing a photo of a BMW car and a Ducati bike at a lavish homestead. The vlogs give the impression that these are achievable within a very few years.

They paint a very rosy picture to the unsuspecting teenager, who cannot even begin to contemplate the sheer magnitude of resolve, perseverance and hard work that is required to get that high. No mention is made of the severe conditions, the high risk, the hazards and the possibility of spending many years languishing in an unknown prison because of being under prepared and inexperienced in the quest for fast promotions and in trying to reach financial targets.

I also found that a few of the Vloggers had given up sea life very early, without a rationale for their leaving sea. Is it, then, the purpose of many to join sea, make money and leave at the earliest? If so, they are depriving a more deserving, financially handicapped candidate from the slot that they occupied for that short period of time.

The sea is not seen to be a career any more. It is just an ATM that has just been filled by the armed security truck.

BUNKERS

Fuel Oil Bunkering and Fraudulent Practices

‘Bunkering’ comes under the heading of ‘essential’ or ‘crucial’ operations in the running of a ship, as it has the potential to turn and lead into a disaster - a fire, loss of life, severe pollution to the environment.

I had made a resolution on the ‘Tarantel’ after the bunker fiasco and the fire that followed, where I came very close to losing my life, that I would personally take full charge of all aspects of bunkers when the responsibility became mine as Chief Engineer. I did so on the ‘Taronga’.

The following paragraphs form the crux of my observations made as Chief Engineer and my endeavours to ensure proper supply. Over the years, I have had several occasions where I have put my foot down and made a big issue of it. One must remember that the Company or Charterers are paying anywhere between $100 to $200 per ton so, as Chief Engineer, I am duty bound to ensure correct quantities are delivered.

Preparation would start even before the Owners would ask for quantities required at the next bunkering port. Checking quantities in each tank, estimating consumption till bunkering port, calculating the space that would be available, guessing what would be the specific gravity and temperature of the oil that would be supplied, calculate how much each tank can take to be filled up to 90% capacity, adding total space available in m3, converting into Metric Tons with guess work of the specific gravity and, finally, requisitioning the necessary quantity of fuel oil – all the above were what was involved.

As far as possible, I tried to avoid taking bunkers into small tanks, because there is a good chance that the tank would overflow. Bunker barges were famous for pumping oil at a greater rate than agreed upon, sometimes causing a surge in the tank where the air does not go out fast enough and, next thing you know, oil overflows from the air pipe. I found that, by good planning, wherein I transferred oil into the smaller tanks before the vessel comes into a bunkering port, I could avoid bunkering into the smaller tanks that had the risk of overflows.

There are a variety of frauds that can be perpetuated on the vessel by the bunker barge. Very imaginative methods have been used to perpetuate the fraud on an unsuspecting Chief Engineer.

Suppose the vessel is to receive 2000 MT of Fuel Oil. The barge specifies that the fuel being supplied is at a Specific Gravity of 0.96 @ 15 degrees C. For ease of pumping, the fuel is heated to, say, 50 degrees C.

The vessel is invited to check the soundings on the barge before start of bunkers. 100% of the time someone, mostly the 4th Engineer, goes down to the barge using a Jacob’s Ladder and witnesses the soundings or ullages of all tanks that contain the oil to be supplied.

The first fraud can occur at this point, with the barge not declaring that there are some more tanks that have not been notified. So, during bunkers, a valve on the line is opened slightly to divert a bit of the quantity to be supplied to the ship. By the time all the barge’s tanks have been pumped up, about 80 to 100 Tons have been diverted into the unnotified tank. After a few hours, the barge says the full quantity has been pumped up and asks for permission to ‘air blow’ to empty the bunker hose. Before the ‘air blow’ is done, the Chief Engineer takes all ullages to calculate the quantity received. Some ships have remote thermometers giving the temperature of each tank. With this calculation, the Chief Engineer finds that the vessel needs to receive about 90 Tons more. The barge Master insists on the Chief Engineer going down to the barge to check his tanks, all of them show empty. There is a stand-off, with both parties insisting that they are right.

The bunker barge has also timed their arrival in such a manner that, around the time bunkers are completed, cargo work is also completed and the vessel is in a hurry to sail out. The bunker barge Master has anticipated the pressure that the Chief Engineer will be under, due to sailing orders and expects that he will succumb and sign for the full quantity whereas, actually, the vessel has received about 90 tons or 5% less. Later, the Chief struggles to balance his daily ‘ROB’ or ‘Remaining on Board’ and starts showing higher than actual / normal consumption. An alert Superintendent in the Office can catch this within 3 days and query the vessel.

To counter this situation, the Chief Engineer needs to do the following:

1. Invite the bunker barge Master to the vessel to witness the vessel’s soundings. If he declines, note it in the Log Book.

2. If the barge has a flowmeter, the probability of fraud is much less, but still exists.

3. Check the barge’s Fuel Oil pipeline layout, which will indicate all tanks.

4. Check the Sounding Tables of the barge. All tanks’ maximum capacities and ullages will be recorded. Unless stamped by a Classification Society stamp, this can also be fraudulent.

5. Keep a track of temperature of the fuel oil at the vessel’s bunkering point and record it.

6. If quantities are less, take a stand and say that you will not sign the Bunker Delivery Note till the fuel quantities are received.

7. Inform the Captain of your vessel to issue a Note Of Protest.

8. Inform the vessel’s Agents and tell him to inform the Port Authorities. Keep copies of initial and final ullages and calculations ready, along with Note of Protest.

9. Invariably, you will find that the bunker Master will cave in.

10. If you know that the port of supply is one in which fraudulent practices are in existence, ask the Company or Charterers to provide an independent Surveyor to attend on vessel’s behalf. They are normally honest, as their livelihood depends upon Companies giving them the Survey. At the same time, the barge Master also knows he can get into trouble locally with Port Authorities on a complaint from the bunker Surveyor. Some Companies or Charterers do not like the additional expense involved in contracting a third party Surveyor.

The second method to defraud is to mix water into the fuel being pumped, thereby supplying lesser quantities.

To find out on the spot, the vessel would need to carry test kits, which were not on board till around 1985. It was around then that vessels also started sending fuel oil samples for analysis to shore based laboratories. This helped in finding water content, especially if the sample taken was a representative sample of the entire bunkering operation. As time went by, more and more parameters were added to the fuel oil analysis, which gave an insight into what should be the purification temperature, what temperature to maintain for injection into the engine, how much is the sulphur content, sodium content, vanadium content, water content and so on. It became a very distinctive part of adjusting the main engine parameters.

The third method of defrauding is to continuously mix air into the fuel, which keeps bubbling to the surface in the tank and the sounding pipe, giving a false and higher sounding or lower ullage, thereby showing an illusory higher quantity.

Normally, when an ‘air blow’ is taking place when tanks are empty on the barge, the barge operator will inform the vessel, at which time, the ship’s staff will close the sounding pipe to prevent oil from ‘showering’ out of the sounding pipe. If the free length of the bunker hose (at the bunkering station) is ‘jouncing’ up and down at other times, it means that a lot of air is being pumped in along with the oil.

When such suspicions occur, the vessel’s final soundings must be taken at least 20 to 30 minutes after completion of bunkering, to allow for the air bubbles to rise to the surface and dissipate. These soundings or ullages will be more accurate and will show up the fraud being perpetrated.

The fourth method of defrauding is to pump sludge along with the oil. This is difficult to find out. The ship will probably suspect it when the fuel oil is in use. The centrifuge will malfunction frequently, the on-line filters will choke up, the fuel injectors will give problems and the combustion will be improper.

A fifth method used to be declaring a higher density, but this could not be sustained due to specific gravity checks on board and, later, laboratory analysis.

These fraudulent practices are factual during the numerous bunkering operations I have supervised in Singapore, more than any other port in the world. During the 1980s, there were several fly-by-night operators of bunker barges who would fill up bunkers from Greek vessels that were at Singapore Outer Roads, carrying oil of spurious origin and retailing it to these bunker barges at less than the market price. These bunker barges would, in turn, sell them to ship operators and try any method to defraud the ships.

The Port of Singapore Authority came down heavily on such practices in the 90’s and, effectively, curbed them. Any complaint made against a bunker barge was taken seriously and the bunker barge company banned from operating in Singapore waters. This was a sound business practice to protect Singapore’s reputation of being one of the world’s largest bunkering ports, earning them billions of dollars in revenue per annum.

There were never any problems of quantity and quality if the suppliers were Shell, BP or any of the reputed oil companies.

Diesel Oil Bunkering

Many of the fraudulent measures listed for Fuel Oil is relevant for Diesel Oil also. But one different aspect that affects the quality of diesel oil is very important. That is acid in the diesel oil.

Industrial waste from shore chemical companies, include waste acids that are costly and difficult to get rid of. Approved plants that incinerate or neutralise these acids are costly to build. Some of them are criminal enterprises that have a licence to process, say, 10 tons of acid waste. They take away 20 tons from the chemical company, who are glad to get rid of it. But they have a capacity to process only 10 tons. They get rid of the other 10 tons (or more) by nefarious means, one of them being mixing the acids into the huge tanks of diesel oil terminals – with the criminal participation of some employees in that terminal – where there are large tanks of huge quantities of Diesel Oil waiting to be transported to ships.

You may well ask how does it matter if such a small quantity of acid – by proportion – mixes with diesel oil. Generators on older ships ran on diesel oil. Later engines had to be started on diesel oil and then changed over to fuel oil. Present environmental regulations may also require changing over Main Engine and Generators to Diesel Oil prior arrival port.

The small quantity of acid in the diesel oil mainly affects plungers and barrels of fuel pumps, which have highly polished surfaces. It is to be noted that the clearance between the plunger and barrel is one of the finest tolerances that can be achieved between two surfaces, in any industry. Were one to take a dry, new, plunger and try and fit it into a barrel, the plunger will not enter the barrel. But, add a coating of clean lubricating oil to both the surfaces, align the two and allow the plunger to enter the barrel and one will find that the plunger takes a minute or more to slowly descend into the barrel. In fact, in the absence of very sophisticated instruments to measure the clearances between plunger and barrel, this "drop" test is the one I resorted to, to find if the barrel and plunger had worn down. The faster the plunger 'drops' into the barrel, the more worn are the parts.

Acid corrosion takes place very quickly and destroys the smooth and polished surfaces of both, plunger and barrel. The fuel pump is unable to pump and the generator is unable to take the load. Unaware of the corrosion taking place, you start another generator which, after a while, suffers the same fate. With the third one also failing, the vessel is now without power in mid sea.

Note the highly polished surface of the plunger

There is a simple test to check for acid in diesel oil. Before bunkering and when barge tank soundings are being checked, put a few drops of this diesel oil on to the back of the palm. If there is any acid content, the back of the palm will burn or cause irritation. You, as Chief Engineer, are well within your rights to refuse to take the diesel oil bunkers. By any means, get a sample from the barge and send it for immediate analysis. Make a ‘Note of Protest’, inform everybody.

In my time as Chief Engineer, I have twice refused to bunker diesel oil on the grounds of acid content, in Miami and Singapore. Laboratory analysis proved me right each time.

This acid contamination was the cause of a tragic mishap on another ship, which I will narrate in another part.

Chapter 4 – Playtime, Entertainment and Going Ashore

The amount of work that I had done during my tenure as 2nd Engineer paid dividends for me when I, once again, sailed on the same ship as Chief Engineer. It was a peaceful tenure of 13 ½ months. Scheduled maintenance and the upkeep of the vessel was what occupied us on a routine basis.

Weekends, when at sea, was when we could indulge ourselves. A nice bar in the Smoke Room was frequented often. Snacks came from the galley. Good weather days at sea were sometimes spent in and around a small swimming pool. We had two air rifles with cartridges, a left over from the Norwegian days, with which we held competitions. I was considered a crack shot – I had won the all-Andhra Pradesh silver medal in .22 rifle shooting in the NCC a long time ago. It was a pleasant tenure, in the aftermath of a really torrid one on the “Tarantel”.

I had a deal with the Watch keeping Officers on the Bridge – ‘please call me if you see anything of interest at sea’. There were many sightings of whales, dolphins and the like. One of the eeriest was when we were gliding in the night through water that had a light green phosphorescent glow which, later, I came to know was caused by a certain type of algae.

Captain Abraham called me up once when we were in the South China Sea on our way to Japan. There was no way we could avoid a 970 millibar (and rapidly dropping) storm that was ravaging the area. The storm registered itself on our radar, including the eye. It was a sight to behold and it made me realise the frailty of our existence on this earth. We could have been battered, but the experienced sailor that he was, he changed course often so that we hardly knew there was a storm behind us.

I quote Capt Abraham’s own words:

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Yes Rangan. I remember that occasion but slightly differently. If my memory serves me right, we were headed for Hong Kong and P-------, I think it was, wanting to know why I was not sticking to my ETA. The projected trajectory of the storm had changed and there was a risk now of us being caught in the full fury of the storm. The Wilhelmsen ship 'Toulose' I believe was lost with all hands on board a few years before (in 1974) in the South China Sea. I slowed down and decided to wait for the next storm centre update before deciding to go in or not and informed the Company that my previous ETA stood cancelled. P------- was upset that I was not maintaining the ETA. When I got my 0200 weather update it seemed we could make a dart for it. I think that is when I called you to the bridge to explain the need for maximum speed till we got to the lee of the islands. You agreed there was no impediment to that request and so full speed maximum it was. I gave the office our fresh ETA. There was still about eight hours to go. Then I got a message from P------- saying that the port was closed and I was to turn back.

Turning back now was suicidal so I let him know that I was coming in pilot or no pilot. Also told him he could arrange for on of those powerful tugs to standby should the need arise

Making a lee to get the pilot on board seemed a greater challenge for me than navigating to the anchorage on one’s own, given my familiarity with Hong Kong port.

So Full speed ahead it stayed. It was not that bad once we got to the pilot area. I remember putting down both anchors at three shackles a piece. Engines remained on continuous 'Standby' till the worst had passed.

The Radio Officer complained to Mr Vijan the Superintendent about me asking for weather reports at unearthly hours and despite my best efforts to save his skin, he was sacked. His reaction to being woken up for a realistic emergency situation doomed him.

Very obviously the perception of danger varies from behind the desk as in P-------’s case to the Seamen playing chess in the recreation room, to the stupid complaint of the Radio Officer.

Perhaps the Radio Officer preferred sending an SOS to being inconvenienced at an odd hour for a storm update. Expect all of the above should you opt for a career at sea.

Perhaps it might ring a bell now or was it another occasion ???

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For my part, I had the added advantage of having been the Second Engineer on the same ship till a few months before, during which period I had personally overhauled all machinery for giving top efficiency. Now that I was back as Chief Engineer, I had every confidence in all machinery and so was able to give the maximum possible power. So we escaped the storm that would have, in all probability, taken our lives. Life hangs by such a thin thread. Although these are the hazards at sea, it is just a normal day at sea after the storm passes. The frightful hazards of the previous day are quickly forgotten.

My financial situation had vastly improved and I was able to take care of my parents, younger brother and sister, along with my own family. I was able to buy a plot of land and build a small house. I had never been lavish in anything and continued remaining frugal. I was also able to start helping some of my poorer relations without anybody knowing. Life was worth living. The satisfaction afforded to me by the job was tremendous. I loved my job and it showed.

Ports such as Kobe, Yokohama, Singapore and Dubai had become like home ports, such was our familiarity with these places.

Dubai was then showing the initial signs of vast development of its infrastructure, with the port being pretty close to the centre of the city. In the following years this port became extremely congested and a new terminal came into being about 60 kms away, at Jebel Ali.

There had been a huge influx of various categories of labour and executives from the sub-continent, most of whom spent a major part of their lives there. At that time, there were no buses or trains and the populace had to depend on private transport from their employers to get to and from work. Thousands of dormitories for the labourers came into existence, practically 90% of them being from India. Their remittances to India formed the bulk of India’s Foreign Exchange reserves, which helped alleviate foreign debt to a large degree. That the economic policies of the Government itself was the cause of such depletion of foreign exchange reserves and the continuation of poverty on a large scale, is something that the politicians in power would never admit.

I interacted with quite a few of them when they came to the ship to work cargo. Quite a number were from Tamil Nadu and I often found myself interpreting. Fun really. They used to tell me of their lives and living conditions in Dubai. Although life was pathetic, they stuck to it, worked hard and became an integral part of the modernization of Dubai. Their families, back home in India, could then afford a house, educate the children and look after their parents.

During the two year period that I was on board the 'Taronga', one of the ports that we always visited in the Persian Gulf was Kuwait City. We would have several consignments of 'break bulk', anywhere between 6 to 10 'Tadano' mobile cranes of various capacities and other cargo to discharge, which would take us 2 to 3 days to discharge.

Above 2 images are representative of the 'Tadano' cranes - hundreds of them over the years - that we carried from Japan to various ports in the Persian Gulf.

My elder brother's close friend and college mate was, at that time, working as the head of a construction firm owned by a Kuwaiti Sheikh. Although I could not go ashore every time due to the work, my wife would go and stay with him and his family on every occasion. As it stood, nobody from the ship would go ashore in Kuwait.

I used to call him up from the port's telephone and talk to him. We knew each other very well, although 8 years of age separated us, as he used to come to our home - in Coimbatore - from the college hostel, just to savour my Mother's cooking. Whenever we had a chance, we used to play table tennis. I was then around 12 years of age. So I knew him very well.

Once in a while, he and his family would visit the ship. I would take him around the Engine Room and he, being a Mechanical Engineer, would be enthused. On his leaving, my wife would go and stay with them for the three days that the ship was in Kuwait.

On many an occasion, he and his wife would pick up my wife at the Port gates, as getting permits for outsiders and cars would involve a lot of officialdom. I would walk with my wife to the gate and wait for him to drive up.

These gates were manned by Pakistani security guards, mostly Pathans. As we waited, they would talk to us. My understanding of Hindi was limited, but my wife could speak Hindi very well and also Urdu to a certain extent. They became so friendly with her, eventually calling her 'Bhabhi' (a term of respect given to the brothers' wife) that, on each visit, she would give them some small gifts - bought in Japan or Singapore - that they could take home to their daughters or wives, back in Pakistan. They would be full of tears. Ferocious looking, 6 1/2 foot hulks would be in tears.

It is only borders that divide us.

The classmate of my brother's and my friend, continued in Kuwait and would have continued till his services were no longer required or age became a barrier to his work. Unfortunately, events took a drastic turn in 1990 when Sadaam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait.

Fortunately, he and his family had been on a holiday in India exactly at the time of the invasion and were, thus, spared their lives. He was not allowed to go back. Most of his savings were in Kuwaiti Dinars - a very strong currency at that time - in Kuwait, along with a beautiful house and belongings acquired over a 25 year period. All lost due to one fell stroke of fate.

He tried his utmost to return to Kuwait. He died of a heart attack within a year, in India.

Chapter 4 – What I Learnt on the Taronga – My Takeaways

Each time I go back on board, I try to improve on my mental attitudes and preparedness. I try to distil and suppress my ego as much as I can. I won’t say that I have been totally successful, but I am on the path. On this ship, for example, where I had been 2nd Engineer and am now back as Chief Engineer, there was a tendency to arrogantly show off to people that I knew the ship better than any of them. It took me the first few weeks to realise that I was not very happy and was very irritable. On introspection, I found that the fault lay in me, where I was letting my pride go before me, which was in total contradiction to who I was and who I wanted to be. Once I accepted that the fault lay within me, I could also see the gateway to redeem and improve myself. I became a better person.

One other problem was that, like my former Chief Engineer Mr. Remedios, I started expecting too much from my juniors. The disappointment would frustrate me and others would sense my frustration. I then realised that, firstly, they had not worked on difficult ships that had severe breakdowns, like I had experience of in SISCO, Trianon and Tarantel. So it was unfair on my part to expect much more than what they were presently delivering. I helped them as much as I could, but I had the distinct feeling that it was not enough.

After a few months of being on board, I started thinking long and hard as to how I would take over a ship as Chief Engineer – what were the important points that I needed to cover when I was relieving another Chief Engineer, what would I inspect personally, generally how I would take over. This led to check lists that I made up, listing all I needed to cover. This needed to, necessarily, be flexible for various time related parameters, as one may get a few days to take over and, sometimes, only a couple of hours. I had to envision such parameters. It kept me thinking.

I made the mistake of sending this checklist to the Office where, instead of being appreciated, was derided with comments of “Is this guy teaching us our job?” kind of a reaction, all except two persons. In the 1990s, with the mandatory introduction of the International Safety Management Code (ISM Code), office bearers were scrambling to put together mandated Safety Manuals, taking over checklists being an important part of them.

Fortunately, these checklists were popular with some of the other Chief Engineers, more by word-of-mouth than anything else.

Teaching all staff various aspects of the Engine Rom machinery slowly started to become a passion. The Singapore crew were not particularly fond of this, so I limited it to the Indian Officers.

I got off the ship on 4th Sept 1982 at Singapore after more than 13 months and went back home.

Rangan

===== End of "Marine Musings 15" - Blog 59 Continues =====