BLOG 51 : "Marine Musings 12" Conclusion - A Massive Fire - A Very Close Brush with Death

A suggestion to those of you who may want to read previous Blogs : When you receive the latest Blog on e-mail, after opening it, you will find a "Check Out Our Site" at the bottom right corner. Clicking on it, you will be led to all the previous Blogs.

Some of you who are reading my Blogs through other means, Linkedin, WixDirect etc., will see a blue lettered "Marine Musings" on the top left corner. Clicking this will lead you to all previous Blogs.

Chapter 8 – A Barrage of Events – Led to a Massive Fire – I Have a Brush with Death

We crossed the Panama Canal, which sight I was unable to enjoy as I was busy in the Engine Room.

We started our Eastern sector ports from Vera Cruz in Mexico. Vera Cruz reminded me of a film that I saw as a 12 year old, starring Gary Cooper and Burt Lancaster.

This was quickly followed by Tampico, Corpus Christi, Houston and New Orleans. All these are pretty short voyages, with Houston and New Orleans having long pilotages up and down river, which tires everyone on board due to long hours and high alert levels.

This part of the narrative is about the New Orleans leg of the schedule. After the Pilot is picked up at the mouth, the ship is piloted up the Mississippi River for about 8 to 9 hours. Apart from cargo work, the vessel was scheduled to bunker Fuel Oil, Diesel Oil and Lubricating Oil, which meant less and less of rest time.

The prelude to the disastrous events that followed was because of a Main Lubricating Oil Pump failure. We were on pilotage, going up river, against the heavy current and about two hours away from the berth. Both Lubricating Oil pumps were on the manoeuvering (bottom) platform, slightly behind me, about 3 metres to my right. It was my watch, around 0600H. I was watching whatever parameters that were being displayed and responding to movement orders, a mug of coffee at the desk. That is when I smelt something peculiar.

I have always been sensitive to smells and could (mostly) differentiate between paper burning, cloth burning, oil burning, electrical wires burning, exhaust gas leaking, the smell of a scavenge fire, what is cooking in the galley, the smell of which is carried down by the blowers and the like.

This smelt different and had a basic metal smell and it was quite close to me.

Checking around me, I saw small sparks coming from the running # 1 Lubricating Oil Pump, just above the mechanical seal cover. I immediately changed over to the standby pump and shut # 1 down. I realised that the pump coupling connecting it to the motor had dropped and the coupling had been rotating and rubbing against the bolts of the cover of the mechanical seal of the pump, causing metal to metal contact and, thus, the smell and the sparks. The entire shaft of the pump had dropped about 50 mm, indicating damaged thrust plates and bush at the bottom of the shaft.

We reached the New Orleans berth safely. US Federal Laws require that if any of the major machinery that are required for manoeuvering and pilotage on the river are not operational, they need to be informed, after which they will assess the dangers and decide whether to stop the ship or allow her to sail, with escort from tugs. The Lub Oil pump failure would have constituted one such scenario, although we had one other LO Pump.

I told the Chief that I will work on the pump and get it ready before sailing that night, with one of the crew to help me. Because of this, I specifically told him I will not be available for bunkering of the different oils.

Sneering as usual, he said “You think I can’t take care of bunkering? You do your job and I’ll do mine”. I told all the engine room staff, except the Fitter, to report to the Chief and carefully assist him for bunkering.

There are certain times when a ship is most vulnerable, at which times it is absolutely important for everybody assigned to the job to be alert. These can be listed, but not confined to, pilotage, entering or leaving a harbour, berthing and unberthing, during the lifting or discharging of heavy cargo, navigating in narrow waters, steering in heavy traffic areas, bad weather and during Bunkering.

Bunkering needs to be an intensely planned operation, from the time the requisition is sent for the quantities of various oils to the final stages of receipt of the oils on board. Because the quantities asked for may be supplied either after 10 days or even within a few days, it is important to figure out the approximate consumption that will take place in the subsequent days and request bunkers accordingly. There is a heavy penalty imposed on the ship if it is unable to take in the full amount of bunkers ordered. Moreover, Company policy may state that bunker tanks are to be filled to a maximum of 90% capacity and not more, to avoid any overflows.

Some ships may have many small tanks, like on the Tarantel, which can cause problems when bunkering, as it will fill up fast and can overflow. Larger capacity tanks give some breathing space to the receiving personnel, where rate of flow can be calculated, ullages taken at right intervals, sounding tables referred to see how much has been bunkered, around what time it will be necessary to open the valve for the next tank and several such operational details. All this was before the advent of remote monitoring.

The Chief Engineer is always fully in charge of the oils, their quantities, their consumptions, their ordering, plans for which tanks to bunker and in what sequence, inform staff well in advance to what ullage each tank must be filled up to, which tank is next and organise the opening of the next tank at the right time.

If there are several small tanks where it will be difficult to bunker into, usually a good Chief Engineer would have transferred fuel from the larger tanks and fill up the smaller tanks when at sea itself. That way, the vessel will have to bunker only into the larger tanks.

On my last ship, the Trianon, and in Sisco, this was the practice, making bunkering operations smooth and with no tension. This had not been done on this ship. There were no pre-bunker meetings, no plan of what quantity or ullage to bunker to, no sequence for changing over tanks – literally nothing. The same crew had taken bunkers before I joined the ship, but I was not aware of how well it was planned or executed.

(After the International Safety Management Code was invoked and became mandatory in the early 1990s, one of the outcomes of the implementing of that Code was documenting the advance planning done for every operation considered crucial and critical to the ship.

Bunkering was one of them, where a “Bunkering Plan” is evolved, a “Bunker Meeting” is arranged and all personnel are made aware of their Normal as well as Emergency Duties.

The “Bunkering Plan” is exactly that - a comprehensive “Plan”.

It shows present (before bunkering) status of each Fuel Oil or Diesel Oil or Lubricating Oil Tanks and what should be the final status which is the trigger point for change of tanks.

It highlights which tanks are being bunkered.

It gives the expected final status of the tank after it is bunkered into.

It shows the sequence to be followed for filling tanks.

It gives a lot of information on what should be the rate of flow, what is the specific gravity and temperature of the oil being bunkered, how many cubic metres and the like.

All personnel involved in bunkering are given a copy.)

This did not exist in 1980, so it was left to the Chief Engineer to organise it in any manner he felt like.

This independence was grist to the mill for this Chief - I don’t think any planning was done, nor were the bunkering personnel made aware of limits to which each tank is to be filled, which was really the cause of the disaster that followed.

A few important details that need to be noted. Firstly, the ship was a DC Current ship. This meant that the motors were all DC motors, large, cumbersome and having commutators with carbon brushes. After 18 years in service, several of the pumps’ commutators were sparking, as they were badly worn.

Secondly, the Main Switch Board was located on a mezzanine floor right forward of the Engine Room, halfway between the bottom platform and the cylinder head platform. All the power cables from the generators were led to this switchboard and on to bus bars. Outgoing tappings were taken for all the electric needs of the ship from these bus bars. All the cable trays were running above the main pumps in the forward section of the Engine Room. There were 3 generators, all 3 of them diesel driven, located on the portside of the bottom platform, to the left and behind the manoeuvering console.

Now, two important jobs commenced at the same time. I had always been taught that, as far as practicable, to avoid any other jobs during bunkering and concentrate exclusively on bunkers. Now, both had assumed importance, one for safety and pollution reasons and the other for fear of delay to the ship, the schedule and fear of detention. On the one side bunkers were started. On the other, I started work on the Lubricating Oil Pump, a screw type vertical pump.

These were IMO vertical 3 screw pumps. On the top of the above diagram are the nuts of the cover against which the coupling was rubbing. On the bottom of the diagram, at the end of the centre drive shaft the thrust collar with bushing can be seen. This was a vertical pump. The motor had to be removed and the pump dismantled. The Fitter and I were working furiously in order to finish the job before cargo work was finished.

Just a bit more about the bottom platform port side layout. I am facing aft when working on the pump. Behind me are 3 generators, all running at around 65% load, as about 10 or more hooks were being used to discharge cargo on deck, which meant about 20 cargo winches were in operation. The generators’ noise was deafening and I was wearing ear protectors.

Right in the forward section of the bottom platform were the 2 Main Sea Water and the 2 Main Fresh Water pumps, one of each were running, with sparking commutators. Above the pumps was the mezzanine floor containing the Main Switch Board. There was about a metre of space between these pumps and the forward bulkhead of the Engine Room. The sounding pipes for the Diesel Oil Bunker Double Bottom Tanks were located in this 1 metre space, close to the Engine Room Forward Bulkhead.

The Fitter and I had taken out the 3 shafts and the bottom bushing, finding that the bottom bush bearing and thrust piece had broken and was in pieces, leaving the shaft unsupported, due to which the whole shaft had dropped. Our next step in the procedure was to remove all the broken pieces, clean the insides of the bottom housing, cool the bush bearing (in the Meat Room), fit the bearing and reassemble. It was tea time, whereon the Fitter had gone up for his tea.

I had seen the 4th Engineer checking the soundings of the Port Diesel Oil Bunker tank a few minutes before. When the Fitter went up, I continued working at the pump site and was bending over and leaning into the well-like casing, when I felt heat on my back.

I turned around and looked forward towards the source of the heat. Right forward, above the height of the generators and where the cooling pumps are located, there was a huge wall of flame and black smoke billowing upwards and towards me, as the air flow from the forward blowers was directed downwards. I yelled for the 4th Engineer and raced as much forward as possible towards the flames. By the light cast by the flames, I could see there was no one forward. I also saw diesel oil gushing out of the sounding pipe. The self weighted cock of the sounding pipe was unable to close itself because the sounding rod was stuck in it. The diesel oil gushing out was feeding the flames more and more. The blowers were supplying a good flow of air.

The flames were reaching above the big tray of wires that carried the power cables from the generators to the Main Switch Board and the outgoing feeder cables to the various pumps. Only steel plating separated the flames and the Main Switch Board and I could not see if it had already set the Switch Board on fire. If the Switch Board were to catch fire, there would be a massive electrical fire all over the ship.

Decisions had to be made quickly. I assessed that I will not be able to fight the fire using the nearby extinguishers as, at the edge of the flames, thick black smoke was billowing out and spreading out and would have enveloped the entire area in a minute or two.

Somehow, I did not panic and kept my senses. To prevent a spreading electrical fire, I stopped all 3 generators by pushing up the fuel levers and locking them, one generator after the other. Suddenly, it became dark except for the light from the flames. Even that was getting increasingly obscured by black smoke.

From the time of sighting the fire to the time all generators were shut down probably took around 20 seconds.

I was about to be overcome by the smoke and realised I had to escape. In the darkness, as I was feeling for the stairs, I lost my torch. But once on the stairs, habits took over and I went up each set of stairs by instinct. I practically collapsed just at the last set of stairs and would have probably become unconscious from smoke inhalation had not the 4th Engineer peeped from the behind the last door which led to the accommodation, saw me and he and the Fitter dragged me up the steps, out into the corridor of the accommodation, after which they closed the Engine Room door. I was gasping for breath but managed to tell them to activate the ‘Fire Alarm’ switch just next to the Engine Room door. These were supplied power from the Emergency Batteries. This was the first alert that went out. I also gasped to the Fourth Engineer to go and shout to the Bunker Barge to stop pumping.

My flight from the bottom platform to safety had taken less than a minute.

It took me a few minutes to recover. After drinking some water, I went to the Muster Station and found most of the Engine Crew at Stations. The Deck Crew were all on deck and would not have heard the alarm. A few who had heard the alarm joined the Muster. A head count could not be taken due to many being out on deck, but I was certain there was nobody in the Engine Room.

Meanwhile the Captain had rushed down and was apprised of the situation. He asked the Stevedore Foreman, who was on deck, to call the Fire Department. Cargo was hanging in mid air at several discharge locations because there was no power.

I started organising the shut down of ventilation dampers of the Engine Room Blowers, Funnel Dampers and skylight panels, while the Chief Officer started getting the crew ready with SCBA sets and Fire Suits with hoses ready to enter the Engine Room. The 3rd Engineer was sent to start the Engine Driven Fire Pump.

Meanwhile, everybody was asking me “Where is the Chief Engineer?” I told the Captain and Chief Officer that he was not in the Engine Room. The 4th Engineer said that he had gone forward.

He came ambling up after about 10 minutes, just as we were ready to make an entry into the Engine Room. What he was doing in the Forepeak Store while all the bunkering action was at midships, is anybody's guess.

The New Orleans Fire Services also arrived. Their Chief sent two men into the Engine Room, properly equipped, and they came out after 2 minutes and said “Since there is no rescue involved, it is better to seal off the ventilation (which was already done) and release CO2. There is a massive fire raging on the forward end”.

The Bunker barge was let go. All stevedores disembarked.

CO2 was released into the Engine Room. Time elapsed was near to 20 minutes since sighting the fire to releasing CO2. We could only wait.

Entry was made into the hold forward of the Engine Room bulkhead and the bulkhead was checked at the lowermost level. It was hot but not red hot. This bulkhead took about 8 hours to cool to normal temperatures.

I went along with the Shore Firemen when we made entry, much later, into the Engine Room to show them the way through the aft Emergency Escape and then through the shaft tunnel, whereon we would be entering the Engine Room from the lowermost point.. Luckily, my insistence over the past few weeks of always keeping the watertight door between the Engine Room proper and the Shaft Tunnel Spaces had borne dividends and the door was in the closed position.

I was also wearing a Fire Suit and SCBA. The fire had died out but glowing embers of twisted electrical cables could be seen. Everything forward of the Main Engine was heavily blackened with soot. Along with one of the Shore Firemen, I went up the small flight of steps to the mezzanine floor and opened one of the Electrical Switch Board Panels. Most of the wires were half burnt. Remarkably, the steel of the switch board panels had not lost their shape. But all areas were blackened with heavy soot. We went out again and checked and ensured that all ventilation was sealed off properly, to prevent any chance of re-ignition.

Right at the outset, the NOLA Fire Chief had ordered up a CO2 Tanker, which came alongside the ship. The Chief Engineer insisted that the Tanker could not be connected to our CO2 line. I remembered the same ‘Kidde’ CO2 system on the Trianon, where a blank was fitted at one end. We made arrangements to quickly connect the Tanker to our CO2 line, in the event it was needed. Luckily, it was not needed.

The Captain told the Chief and me to write our reports and keep it ready for the investigation to follow. I wrote out my report giving the details as above.

Next morning’s inspection proved that everything had been extinguished. But there was extensive damage to all cables, all pumps in the forward areas. Remarkably, only the electrical portions of the main switch board were damaged. The panels and bus bars inside were blackened by heavy soot.

Mr. Ahuja, from the BSM Hong Kong Office, came aboard a couple of hours later. He had just joined the Company after a period of service with SCI. He was ensconced with the Captain and Chief Engineer for a few hours. Two hours after their meeting started, the Chief Officer, who had been in the Captain’s cabin for a while, came down and told me that I was being thrown to the wolves, as the Chief Engineer had shifted the entire fault to me, in spite of my not having been involved at all with bunkers and in spite of my detailed explanatory report.

I just shrugged my shoulders and waited for the axe to fall. I also wrote out my resignation letter and kept it in my pocket.

I was called after 4 hours to the Captain’s cabin. Mr. Ahuja spoke angrily to me. The Chief Engineer was shouting at me. After about ten minutes of this, I told the Chief Engineer to shut up. Then I told them all “All you want is a scapegoat and you have already decided that it is me. I hate being yelled at. Here is my resignation letter, if that will please you”.

Then I turned to Mr. Ahuja and told him, in front of the others “It looks like you have already made a decision to hang the entire incident around my neck. But, have you read my report properly?”. To his credit, he said “I only skimmed through it but have taken the Chief Engineer’s account as true”. I said “If you have come here to find a scapegoat, you have succeeded. If you have come here as an Investigating Officer, you have failed. You should investigate thoroughly before you fire me. I can produce evidence from many a crew member that I was not involved with bunkering at all, but I will not do so as it will lower the dignity of the Officer cadre in front of the crew.” And I left the room to pack.

As I was packing, I kept pondering over the events since I joined the ship. Why were bad events centred around me? I remembered the advice given a few months ago by the old man, the astrologer, telling me not to join because “death is surrounding you”, his exact words, although in Tamil.

As I was looking around the cabin, I noticed that the previous 2nd Engineer had left quite a number of mementos hanging on the cabin walls, all bought when crossing the Suez Canal, all to do with Egyptian mummies, all to do with death. The old man was right – I was surrounded by death. I took them all out, went to the ship’s side and threw them into the water.

By then, it was evening. I had dinner and waited for my official dismissal. Several hours had passed and the sword had not fallen. I waited.

About 2000H, Mr. Ahuja knocked on my cabin door and came in. He had been prepared to fire me forthwith in Captain's cabin, but he had hesitated only because I asked him whether he had read my statement which, admittedly, he had only glanced through. After I had left, he went through my report thoroughly and had second thoughts, as it was in complete variance with the Chief Engineer's. Moreover, he had been cut to the quick about my asking him directly whether he had come to investigate or find a scapegoat. (All this I came to know later).

He only said “Tell me everything that you want to tell me”. I spoke. After a couple of hours he said “Do you have some beers in the ‘fridge?”. I reminded him that there was no power but, yes, I did have beers in the fridge. We both took some beers, went out on to one of the decks outside the accommodation and I continued. My diary came in very handy, because of which I could relate every incident in excruciating detail, although I remembered practically every detail without consulting the diary. The diary gave me dates. I spoke for more than 5 hours and we had as many beers. At the end of it, I went to sleep. He went ashore, ostensibly to make a phone call to Hong Kong.

Later, Mr Ahuja told me that more than my spoken testimony, it was the diary of events that more than convinced him of the state of affairs on board.

Next morning, immediately after breakfast, Mr. Ahuja came over and told me that except me, almost all were being sacked and sent home. He added “Please keep this confidential – even the Captain is not in the know”.

Meanwhile, arrangements were made to tow the ship to a shipyard, I do not remember which one.

Shore power was established at the shipyard.

Events followed swiftly.

The Chief Engineer was summarily sacked. I saw him pleading with Mr. Ahuja, to no avail.

The Captain was given a reprieve. He continued to remain in the Company.

The previous 2nd Engineer was not given another contract. But he was a very lucky person. Years later, he went on to become the CEO of a different Ship Management Company before he was thrown out of there.

The Chief Officer remained.

The Third Engineer and Fitter remained.

I think most of the Deck Crew remained; some had finished their contract and went on leave.

The Engine Crew were all sacked by Singapore Organisation of Seamen and had to bear all travel expenses. Due to their near mutiny, their membership in the Union was cancelled.

My batch mate, Gopakumar, joined as Chief Engineer and opted to come to this ship in spite of its problems, more because he had faith in me and wanted to encourage me and show support for me.

I was told by Mr. Ahuja that, because of the excellent Confidential Reports from the Master and Chief Engineer of the MV Trianon, I had been slated for promotion to Chief Engineer. But this incident would delay the promotion. He also added that I was the first and only one to receive an excellent report from Mr. Remedios, the Chief Engineer of my previous ship. My reply to him was “I am not one to run away. I will prove my worth, work for my promotion and not l eave the Company till I get get promoted in this Company”. I am, by nature, the stubborn type and I proved it by working to reach the rank of Chief Engineer a couple of years later.

Call it coincidence, call it surreal, mythical, mystical – but everything good started taking place within hours of my throwing out the wall mountings of Egyptian royalty who were then, and now, in a mummified state.

From that date, I became a firm believer that symbols of death should not be close to you. I accept that death is inevitable, but there is no need to surround yourself with its presence. It is foolish to build a mansion in a cemetery or a burning ghat.

Further investigation proved that my initial action in stopping the generators was the right one, as commented on by the Investigator from US Coast Guard. The reason for the overflow was found to be the ordered quantity was sufficient enough to fill the Diesel Oil Double Bottom Tank tank to 104% capacity. The pumping rate was not monitored and was too high, both of which caused the overflow. The main cause stipulated was negligence in planning of bunkering.

When the tank had overflowed, the Diesel Oil splashed on to the sparking commutator of the pump motor and caught fire. The Fourth Engineer, who was alone taking soundings with a with a graduated flat steel rod with a rope tied to it, panicked and ran away, leaving the graduated rod in the sounding pipe. The oil kept gushing out, till pumping was stopped by the barge.

Had the Fourth Engineer removed the graduated rod from the sounding pipe and removed the temporary clamp for keeping the sounding pipe (Normally done during bunkers), taking those additional 10 seconds, the self weighted cock would have closed the sounding pipe of its own accord. But I guess, the fire was too close to the Fourth Engineer. He was pragmatic enough to run out of the Engine Room, after which only did he realise I was down in the Engine Room.

A rather droll observation made by me, after the fact was that, had the sounding pipe's self weighted cock closed off the sounding pipe, the Diesel Oil would have filled the Double Bottom, risen in the Overflow pipe and filled up the Overflow Tank. The Overflow Tank was a rather large tank and was empty then.

Anyway, we were now in the Ship Yard for repairs.

The first two days were the slowest, as the shipyard was not used to this kind of a job and had to plan properly. After this, one event followed another in quick succession, all meant for getting the ship back in order. First the burnt cables were cut and removed, after noting how they were connected. All cables from the generators and Main Switch Board were removed. All cable trays were cut away. All the pumps in the forward section were removed. The switch board was completely dismantled. The panels were all ash blasted and powder coated. Bus bars were all load tested to 5 times their normal operational parameters and found good. The soot blackened Engine Room was washed down and painted.

New armoured cables had to be ordered from a Californian company and took a few days to arrive. New cables, new cable trays, overhauled pumps, assembled switch board – all came back into shape. The whole job rested on the experience of one man from the yard, with the vessel’s Electrical Officer proving his worth by ensuring the job was done properly and correcting mistakes as they were occurring. (He was, later, offered a job by the very same shipyard, but he refused.)

The job was completed and all tests carried out successfully in about 5 weeks.

We, then, continued on our interrupted voyage, carried out cargo operations in numerous ports on the Eastern seaboard of the USA. We were also asked to prepare for drydocking in Europe, with a possible sale of the vessel.

New Orleans: I went ashore mostly on week ends when the Yard was closed. The music and jazz of Bourbon Street enthralled me. On one occasion, I stood in a queue for 3 hours to get into a bar cum restaurant called “Al Hirt’s”, to hear his jazz on the trumpet, with an excellent accompanist on the saxophone. Practically every evening a few of us would go just outside the ship yard, where there was a Burger joint, staffed by Filipinos. Everybody else had burgers. I had ice creams of all kinds, a gastronomic treat. It is possible that the seeds of my future diabetes were planted then.

While at New York, I saw something unique from Barber’s view point. There were four ships with the same funnel of two Saffron stripes, as given in the first of the 4 below, all next to each other.

I remember going ashore in New York to Manhattan. I took a cab. The cab driver was pretty talkative and asked where I am from. When I said India, he said a little offensively “What gives India the right to test a nuclear device”? He said there was an article in one of the papers of nuclear devices tested, which mentioned that India had tested one in 1975. In return, I asked him “What gives USA, France, UK this right to do the same thing that we should not be allowed to do?” He thought about it and said “Yes, you are right. Nobody has an exclusivity on anything just because they are strong militarily”. End of story.

One of the striking features of the voyage out of New Orleans to the ports on the Eastern Seaboard was the use of the Ocean Current known as the Gulf Stream Drift that travels from south to north close to the coast at a speed of around 3 knots. By navigating properly, this current can be used to increase the ship’s speed by at least 2 knots, thereby saving on fuel. This is a warm current, and curves eastwards across the North Atlantic Ocean, thereby benefiting shipping.

I cannot recollect the ports we visited prior dry docking in Rotterdam, but all cargo had been discharged in anticipation of the docking and possible sale. Being winter, Rotterdam was cold.

A few days into the dry dock, I was signed off on 14th Dec 1978, exactly 4 months after I boarded the ship and was flown to Penang in Malaysia to join MV Tema.

With the changed circumstances after the fire, I rather enjoyed the stay on board. Things went smoothly; problems were solved without resorting to any abusive language.

I am writing this anecdote of my experiences on the Tarantel more than 42 years later. But the events are fresh in my mind. Bringing them to the surface is painful, for I have not come across such antipathy and such ignorance combined in one person, along with abusive language. I did what I thought was right and, being as stubborn as a mule, executed them into actions. Were I given a chance to travel back in time with the knowledge of what transpired, I would not have joined this ship. I lost my chances of immediate promotion for which I had to wait more than 2 years.

Chapter 9 – Lessons Learnt by Me on the Tarantel – My Takeaways

My first takeaway from the incidents on the Tarantel would be to listen to the elders who give you advice, especially if they are the humble type who have no axe to grind. The gout ridden and poor astrologer had no reason to warn me not to go. I did not pay heed to him and thus suffered for the better part of 3 months and, in the process, lost my chance of a promotion for the next two years, a promotion that was almost certain to take place within the next few months. I know astrology is not considered scientific and rational, more as a pseudo-science that does not have any basis in reality.

But look at it from a different view point. These astrologers are consulting almanacs that show the latest positioning of stars and planets and which have been kept updated for thousands of years. The positioning of the constellations and particular stars and all the planets play an important role in predicting what is happening in a person’s life. That they have been able to work out the various orbits of not only planets but also stars and constellations more than 3000 years ago, with merely crude telescopes, shows an ingenuity that is more comparable to today’s age of the Hubble Telescope and other technologically advanced gizmos that stare into space and, through a designed computer, tells the astronomer what he is looking at, rather than feed him information that he can assess for himself. How were they able to come to this degree of near precise accuracy unless they had a good, sound, knowledge of what is theorised today and, with it, a fair amount of intelligence?

Unlike today, generations of the same family spent their whole lives in pursuing the same subject that their forefathers had started and, in their collective wisdom, they were able to predict the orbits more or less accurately. They, then, took it one step further. Although the grounds on which they did this is yet to be found or established, they assigned certain personalities and characteristics to each of the planets and stars and constellations, which also changes with the position of where each is located in the orbit, its aphelion and perihelion. I said they went one step further in which they assigned the changing characteristics to humans and said that they affected humans. Logically, if they are found to have the wisdom to predict orbits of celestial bodies that they can hardly see, thousands of years ago, should we deny them the wisdom where they one step further and interrelated the orbital travel of those bodies with human behaviour and forecasting the future? Astrology is considered irrational. So are quite a number of aspects of human behaviour, for the simple reason that not enough is known about them. One must remember that man has been able to tap into an average of 10% of his own brain. If he taps into 12%, he is considered a genius. What, then, constitutes the rest of the unused and unexplored 90%? What is hiding in there? Or is it that we have lost the abilities that go with the other 90% over a period of millennia?

My only comment on escaping the claws of death by less than 10 seconds is “Death, do not be saddened. I cannot escape your clutches forever. One day I will be yours.”

I should have run away from such an acrimonious and abusive environment. The problem is, I am a stubborn person. One day, it will be the death of me.

When a crew starts bullying and intimidating those in charge, it is time for either one to go home. Just because a precedent has been set by one person for his own benefit, does not mean his successor needs to follow it. You tread your own path courageously.

When you tangle with a higher up, be sure that your premises are correct. Instinct made me keep a detailed diary of events which, later, came to my rescue. The first event and confrontation with the Chief Engineer regarding high consumption of fresh water, about which he had done nothing for six months, was damning in itself, in spite of several complaints from the Chief Officer. The other entries in my diary only added substance to the evidence.

One does not need to standby and tolerate obnoxious and abusive behaviour from anyone. It can be dealt with by avoiding that person and having nothing to do with him or confront him. Almost all bullies are cowards. Confront them and they will tone down things. I had no choice but to meet or talk to the Chief Engineer several times a day, as my rank demanded it. But, after the first confrontation in his cabin – where he did not have the courtesy to ask me to sit down – I chose to not go to his cabin and arranged meetings in common areas.

‘Yathaa Raja, Thathaa Prajaa’ is an old Sanskrit saying, meaning “as is the king, so are the subjects”. The last 2nd Engineer did no work and went ashore for the maximum time possible in every port. So, none of his juniors worked at all nor thought of bringing machinery problems to the 2nd Engineer. I resolved to be a role model and make myself easily accessible to my juniors.

Certain ship operations, some of which I had listed in this particular narrative, makes the ship vulnerable to very serious consequences in the event of even small failures. One of them is bunkering.

Bunkering requires rigid planning, attention to detail, more than sufficient personnel with each person’s role clearly specified, system of communication established. In the 1970s, Walkie Talkie sets were not available to ship board personnel. Communicating with one another was often done by using a messenger or hand signals from one portion of the ship to another. But bad planning, massive errors in calculating quantities to be bunkered into each tank, no briefing of personnel and no proper leadership all combined led to this fiasco. If done properly, the massive fire could have been avoided.

My takeaway from this incident was that, in future, I will not allow somebody else to do the planning alone. I will be involved in the process from beginning till end and will provide the leadership to such an extent that nobody’s life is put at risk, nor any danger of pollution.

Rangan

===== End of Marine Musings 12 ==

=== Marine Musings 13 to Continue =====