BLOG 37 - We seek a 'Port of Refuge' - Declare 'General Average' - Seek Cause of Explosion - IMDG

Flashback

In the previous Blog (36), I had narrated a severe explosion that we had, originating in the Fore Peak Store, followed by massive fire.

The 'Chippy' had died in the explosion. We pulled him out.

We fought the fire and, after 4 hours or so, brought it under control and extinguished it.

Fore Peak tank levels were the same as sea level, indicating a hull breach.

Slowly # 1 Hold filled with water upto sea level, indicating a possible Collision Bulkhead damage or another breach in the shipside hull of # 1 Hold. It could have breached at the 'vertical side frame' (as in sketch below).

Cross section of a Bulk Carrier (from Wikipedia)

The Fore Peak Store deck plating was torn from side to side, along a weld and had bulged upwards by about 2 metres.

The Paint Room which was located on the port side of the Fore Peak Store, had a door that faced the main deck. The paint Room was bulkheads had been torn, the plating holding the door was blown to # 4 hatch along with the door.

The Fore Peak Store's roofing, which was also the deck plating of all machinery and bits on the Forecastle, had bulged upwards. Possible damage to Windlass and Winches - especially bending of shafts - was suspected, but could not be ascertained. Since the electrical switchboards in the Fore Peak Stores were all burnt, we ran cables from # 1 Cargo Crane and, using the crane's safeties, tried out one winch and one windlass - meant only for emergency use.

Chapter 3 – The Aftermath – We seek a ‘Port of Refuge’

Once we came to know that the Forepeak Tank was flooded and there was a considerable amount of water in # 1 Hold, which had already damaged the coal cargo, it was decided to make for a ‘Port of Refuge’. Luckily, there was no pollution incident, as no oil tank ruptured, even though there was an oil tank in very close proximity to the scene of the fire and explosion.

It was, later, felt that, in a way, the ingress of water into # 1 Hold was a blessing in disguise, as it reduced or stopped the emanation of volatile gases from the coal cargo, which could have kept feeding the fire in the Fore Peak Store or exploded in # 1 Hold itself. This could have set off a chain reaction and led to the whole ship exploding.

With # 1 Ballast Double Bottom tanks and # 1 Top Side tanks on both port and starboard holding tight, with no ingress of water, it became obvious that either the Collision Bulkhead which, on this ship, was the bulkhead between the Forepeak tank and # 1 Hold, had ruptured or cracked, or we had a hull breach on the shipside in # 1 Hold.

Now that people could go in safely into the Forepeak Store, a sounding and an ‘ullage’ of the Forepeak Tank showed that the water level inside the tank matched the level from deck to the waterline on the sea. Within a period of 24 hours, the water level in # 1 Hold was the same as the Forepeak. The gradual rise was synonymous with a small crack on the Collision Bulkhead. We were very much ‘down by head’, but were not sinking.

Brisbane was the closest port that had repair facilities, so we diverted to Brisbane, making it our ‘Port of Refuge’.

In maritime parlance, something known as “General Average” was declared, due to the damage sustained to vessel and cargo.

“Due to the prevailing situation and the extraordinary efforts put in by the Master and crew of a vessel to save the ship and cargo, in spite of damages sustained by the vessel by any means, the Ship Owner can decide, on the advice of the Master, to declare “General Average”. With this declaration, it implies that all parties that have a stake in the vessel and its cargo will come together and proportionately bear the losses incurred.”

This adjunct to Maritime Law came from the York Antwerp Rules of 1890, updated a few times as per the exigencies of the day.

Declaring “General Average” is not exactly a common phenomenon in Maritime Circles, hence I mentioned this in more detail.

With the vessel down by head quite a bit, we were unable to empty out the Fore Peak tank as there was a (suspected) hull breach below the water line. But the Water Tight Bulkhead between # 1 Hold and # 2 Hold held its integrity, as did the other bulkheads. As of now, the damage sustained could not be rectified, but did not pose further danger to the ship, apart from the vessel being down by head.

We slowly made our way into Brisbane and docked.

From World Atlas

A horde of Surveyors representing every stake holding party descended on the ship to get the documentation and reports needed from the ship, make their own inspection and report back to their principals.

The Classification Society Surveyor also inspected the damage sustained. The cause could not be immediately ascertained, but it was evident that explosive gases had been present in the atmosphere of the Fore Peak Store and the summer sun beating down on the steel deck plates, which formed the roof of the Forepeak Store, had made the gases volatile, especially as the Store had been kept closed for more than 36 hours.

It was also found that the particular grade of coal that we were carrying was highly toxic, the gases emanating being volatile enough to explode if exposed to a heat source.

This leads me into a topic that has become more and more important and also more relevant in recent years due to the spate of accidents brought about by the carriage of Dangerous Goods.

In the early 1970s, there were not many mandatory regulations in the carriage of dangerous goods. For over a hundred years, small changes were made to Maritime Laws to regulate the carriage of dangerous or harmful goods. It was not until 1959 that concerted efforts were started to classify goods that were dangerous and the method of carrying those goods safely. The IMDG Code (International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code) then came into existence and was a recommended ‘Instrument’ intended to become part of SOLAS. As with all Instruments, it took its own sweet time towards ratification by member nations, finally done in 2002.

But in 1974, at the time the explosion took place, it was not mandatory for the shipper to reveal all aspects of the cargo. Hence, we were not aware of its toxicity nor its explosive tendency.

Today, the same cargo can be loaded only with a host of documentation detailing its toxicity, explosive levels, mandatory methods of daily checks, how to prevent a fire or an explosion, how to contain one and many more details. After sailing out, the ship has to compulsorily record the daily readings of hold temperatures, explosive level present using the Explosimeter with an alarm being sounded if about to reach limits.

I have been on a ship where, when we were carrying a particularly toxic and explosive grade of coal. On good weather days, the Captain used to turn the ship, so the winds blew athwartships, across the hatches, and the crew wearing gas masks and rubber galoshes, opened the hatch covers a metre or more to allow gases to escape. Of course, I have been in a quandary since then, whether this was correct or not. Suffice it to say that nothing untoward happened. Any comments on this?

It was not until 2002 that the IMDG Code was ratified and became mandatory. More and more items are being added to the list of ‘Dangerous Goods’, because of which more and more documentation is required.

For example, Lubricating Oil supplied in drums must come with Safety Data Sheets, detailing Safety and Health hazards and much more. Chemicals supplied in drums also require Safety Data Sheets.

Fuel Oil samples and samples of Lubricating Oils in use on the engine (about a litre each, in quantity) are sent from the ship regularly for analysis to laboratories all over the world by courier. Nowadays they require an attached Safety Data Sheet, without which the parcel cannot be sent.

In my frank opinion, the present IMDG Code has gone from one end of the spectrum - of doing very little to address toxicity - to the other end - where the most innocuous of substances are now classified as “Dangerous” in some form of the other.

The consequences of having such rules applied to a wide variety of products, has only made the seafarer’s life harder. He now has more forms to fill, more checks - mostly innocuous - to make and document, instead of fully concentrating on his core job - that of running and maintaining the ship.

As I write this (in 2022), the numerous IMDG Code regulations have nearly strangulated life on board, more so with Dangerous Goods being packaged and containerised. Apart from innocuous substances being classed as ‘dangerous’, we now have containers containing chemicals the full properties of which have not been fully disclosed and which cause damage to life and vessel.

The MV X-Press Pearl is a very recent disaster that would have gone down as one of the world’s environmental disasters, had it happened off the US Coast or even the European Coast. But it happened too far away from them, off a couple of ‘Third World’ countries, newsworthy only in the sense that the editorials can bash the country involved for not providing proper security or assistance.

Net result of the environmental disaster - the rich fishing grounds of Sri Lankan and Indian fishermen destroyed. Thousands of varieties of sealife destroyed.

MV X-Press Pearl on fire - off Colombo

X-Press Pearl just before she sank.

Note the extreme angle of the bent jib of crane, showing intensity of fire.

It is believed the leakage of properly declared, but inappropriately or incorrectly packed or stowed nitric acid caused the X-Press Pearl fire. Nitric acid is a corrosive, toxic and flammable liquid — and the X-Press Pearl was carrying 25 tonnes of it.

Quote from Wikipedia:

The ship was carrying multiple classes of dangerous goods including sodium hydroxide (caustic soda) in holds as well as at least one container of nitric acid which was leaking on deck.

Unquote

From the Economic Times:

“Fires once emanated from engines, but they are now just as likely to originate in the cargo itself, with incorrectly packaged or misdeclared chemicals the second-most prevalent cause of fire after charcoal.

In fact, data indicate the possibility of more than 150,000 annual cases of undeclared or misdeclared dangerous goods capable of causing fires. The incidence may be higher depending on the shipping route.

Another fire risk has to do with competition between shipping companies, which is based on carrying capacity and efficiency. This has forced an exponential growth in container ship sizes, which escalates the probability of a fire. It also makes detecting a fire difficult, if not impossible, until it is well advanced.”

And what is the conclusion of the report in the ‘Economic Times’?

“Fire safety on ships could be improved with better training to promote best practice in protecting and preserving the integrity of cargo.

SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) regulations govern on-board firefighting. But these are outdated, having come into force in 1980. They need to be amended to suit the current era of large and ultra-large vessels, like X-Press Pearl.

Organisational procedures, such as those of the American Bureau of Shipping, promote earlier fire detection and mo.dern maritime industries.”

In other words, seafarers have not been ‘trained’ for such fires. It is the same old story of ‘blame it on the seafarer, he has no forum which will support him and fight back’. ‘Protect the integrity of the cargo’ - even if it means spilling the life of the seafarer. I think the reporter was ignorant of the newer regulations that are in force.

Meanwhile, the unscrupulous - the manufacturer, the packager, the booking agents, the shipping company - all do not figure in the list of guilty ones.

My apologies for once again digressing away from the narrative. Maybe ‘digress’ is not the correct verb as it does not convey what I want to say. ‘Digress’ is defined as “to turn aside especially from the main subject of attention or course of argument”. But I feel that wherever I am digressing, I am expanding on a closely related subject.

Coming back to the narrative, as Brisbane did not have the facilities for the extensive repairs that were needed, it was decided to carry out temporary repairs, repair the breach in the hull, pump out the water from the fore peak, do some internal strengthening of structural members and give a temporary certificate of sea worthiness for one voyage only, so that major repairs can be carried out in Japan.

The breach on the hull was temporarily repaired by sealing from the outside, under water.

Pumping out the water from the Fore Peak proved to be a monumental task, as we found out, much to our chagrin. After the hull breach was temporarily repaired, we started the Ballast Pumps to pump out the water. After about 10 minutes, the pump stopped rotating. On opening the pump, we found the impeller jammed with ‘Sutli’ (Twine) that had fallen into the Fore Peak tank and was sucked in to the pump. Nothing else could be done except use each pump, open each pump casing, remove the ‘Sutli’ and restart the pump. We did this for the next 48 hours before the pipes became clear. A two hour job extended to 2 days.

Inside a Fore Peak Tank (from YouTube)

After the water had been pumped out, the Fore Peak tank was opened, ventilated, gas freed for hot work and repairs carried out in the tank. The hull breach was repaired and welded from the inside. During the process, we also worked in the tank and removed all debris. In retrospect, we need not have bothered, the reason for which will be clear on reading what happened when we reached Japan.

And what was the underlying cause of the explosion and the fire? Along with the experienced Lloyd’s Surveyor, we investigated what happened, how and why. After a couple of days we realised what, how and why it happened. Once again, I was with the Surveyor.

Obviously, explosive gases had entered from the cargo hold into the Fore Peak Store. The question to be answered was “How did the gas get in, when the area is supposed to be sealed off from the Hold area?” We then started looking for possible cracks in the collision bulkhead, the top portion of the bulkhead being common to # 1 Hold and Lower Fore Peak Store. No cracks were found, but the metal of the bulkhead had thinned down.

On poring over the ship’s drawings and particularly the forward area drawings, we noticed something peculiar. All the mushroom ventilators were sitting on top of the water tight bulk heads situated exactly between holds. In other words, each ventilator was serving two hatches, which looked rather peculiar. Should a ventilator be shared to ventilate two adjacent holds? It did not sound logical.

Continuing the ventilator checks, we reached # 1 Hold mush room ventilators. The ventilators aft of # 1 hold were shared with the forward side of # 2 Hold.

Moving to the forward ventilators of # 1 Hold, we found that the two mushroom ventilators were situated exactly on the Collision Bulkhead and were partly ventilating # 1 Hold and partly ventilating the Fore Peak Store.

We had found the cause.

Because the forward ventilators were shared between # 1 Hold and Fore Peak Store, gases from the hold had entered the Store. There was no blower fitted in the Store. The gases accumulated over a hot weekend and exploded Monday morning. There was speculation that the ‘Chippy’ may have lit a cigarette, but there was no evidence to support it. He had no cigarettes nor a lighter on his person when we found the body.

It was attributed to “Spontaneous Combustion” when some oxygen entered the compartment on Monday morning, resulting in a mixture between ‘Lower Explosive Limit’ and ‘Upper Explosive Limit”, which is considered ripe enough for an explosion to take place. The hot sun beating down on steel surfaces provided the heat source.

The Company was informed in detail in order to check on the sister ships and take preventive action.

Due to the damages sustained, several “Conditions of Class” were imposed on the ship. A “Condition of Class” is given by the Classification Society Surveyor when a defect is noted and a certain time period is specified to rectify the defect. If the defect is rectified within the time period specified, the vessel retains ‘Class’. If ‘Class’ is not retained, then the vessel can lose its licence to trade, along with a host of other problems. I will not elaborate them here as I will be digressing.

===== Blog 38 Continues with a pleasant 'Interlude' and the Aftermath of the Fire =====