BLOG 34 - An Angry Sign Off - Dragging Anchor - Ship in Peril When Transiting Gibraltar

Sometimes, you have no choice but to sail with greedy people. Sometimes, you have no choice but to sail with people with inflated egos, who refuse to listen to advice, because it comes from a junior.

When you sail with both the types at the same time, shipboard life can become miserable and you wish you were elsewhere. Luckily, the greedy one left the ship after a couple of months of my being on board.

The incidents in this narrative are of the 'unsavoury' kind. It exposes the underbelly of persons in power who unashamedly exploit others to line their own pockets and fill their stomachs, the rest be damned. It exposes the dark mind of egotism that impels one to think that one is always in the right. It also exposes my lack of man management skills and the obstinacy in me.

Marine Musings 6

Chapter 6 - Of Food, Mess Committees and Coffin Sized Packing Cases - I am branded a 'militant' Third Engineer

During the time that I spent in the fore part of the ship to repair the Emergency Fire Pump Engine, I noticed something peculiar. The Carpenter – ‘Chippy’ to the geriatric seafarer – was constructing packing cases, nearly the size of coffins, all from plywood supplied to the ship as part of Ship’s Stores. Chippy told me that, as the Captain was signing off with his family at the next port of Goa, he had been tasked with making a dozen such cases.

It was also during this period in Kandla that it dawned on me that the standard of food served to us was consistently below mediocre, with nothing stocked in the ‘fridge. This was contrary to a SISCO ship, as the Company prided itself on the excellent quality of food served on board, so much so that the Chief Cook and Second Cook had to undergo a practical test at the campus where many of the Company executives stayed, and would be sent on board only after adjudging his culinary prowess. Something was seriously wrong.

2 to 3 months before, the Company had issued a Circular which stated that all ships must elect a Mess Committee, with certain strictures and detailing the duties of the Mess Committee members. I had been shown the Circular when I visited the Office, prior joining the ‘Perumai’ at Nagapattinam, so I was aware of the contents.

I asked the Captain about the Mess Committee. He acted as if he had only then remembered the Circular. Next morning, there was a notice on the Notice Board stating “To comply with the Company’s instructions, a Mess Committee is hereby formed. The members will be the Captain, the Chief Engineer and the Purser…..Signed Master”.

This was in violation of the circular which did not allow the Captain or Chief Engineer to be in the Mess Committee. Furthermore, the 3 Members had to be elected from amongst the Officers. When I pointed this out, I was branded a troublemaker.

But the Captain had no other recourse than to call a meeting of Officers to elect a Committee. He tried his best to ensure that I was not elected, but the 3 Junior Engineers proposed my name and I was elected, along with the Purser and 2nd Officer. The Purser was the Chairman of the Committee. Being under the thumb of the Captain, he was vulnerable as his job security depended on the whims and fancies of the Captain. But basically, he was a decent person.

We held a formal Mess Committee meeting which the Captain wanted to attend as an ‘observer’. But along with him came his wife. I objected and said this is no more a Mess Committee meeting. He and his wife left in a huff. The Company Circular was read out and we distributed our duties, some of them overlapping.

Added to my being victimized unduly by the Captain and Chief Engineer, the quality of food on board had been bugging me. A few days later, the ongoing fraud came to light.

Provisions had been ordered and were being picked up clandestinely. The 2nd Mate saw this and informed me, so I got hold of the Purser and went to check on quantities and quality of the items supplied. Although the prices seemed highly inflated, it was not in our purview to check on the costs, only the Captain having that right.

We went to check the provisions. Over 70% of tinned items were well past the expiry dates and were rejected. We also found three other large packages where the same items were carefully packed marked “Captain” and were fresh. The Chief Steward, who was party to this fraud, complained to the Captain. The Captain tried to pressurize the Purser into accepting the expired items, but I was there and flatly refused. The meat eaters told me the meat was not fresh and would not last long, even when frozen in the Meat Room. The vegetables’ quality was very poor.

I informed the Captain that, unless the bad quality items were replaced with good quality, I would have no hesitation in informing the Company by phone of his fraudulent activities. Through the Chief Steward, he tried to bribe me. I told the Chief Steward that he had also been a party to months and months of this fraud, so he’d better come clean or his job was at stake. By that time my blood was up. I was aghast at the fact that somebody would give less food to all staff in order to line his own pockets.

The fraudulent activities had now seen the light of day. To assuage the Mess Committee, the defective items were replaced.

The food quality showed slow signs of improvement.

Chapter 7 – The Captain signs off

We sailed out of Kandla and anchored in Goa, for loading iron ore for Romania.

Three days later, the new Captain boarded the vessel. The old Captain was due to leave the next day, by launch. By now, all the coffin sized packing cases were on deck and had been nailed down. The Purser quietly told me that the contents of these boxes were all items from Ship’s provisions kept separately hidden over the last few months. But 12 coffin sized cases?

Being on the warpath, I took a crowbar and started opening the boxes around midnight. The 2nd Mate saw me and helped me. The 4th Engineers also came to help. What we saw in the boxes was shocking. Three of the cases were filled with Kraft cheese tins, chocolate cartons, coke cans, cartons of juice bottles, cartons of jam and marmalade, beer cases, cases of Scotch whisky and any and all items that would not spoil, all in huge quantities.

The other cases had all the foldable deck chairs that we had used during a party. Each chair had labels that it belonged to such-and-such Officer’s cabin. The cadet was supposed to return the chairs to each cabin the next day after the party. All of us had forgotten about these chairs, as we do not use them often. On later questioning, the cadet stated that he had been told by the Captain to stack them in a spare cabin and give him the key.

Only two of the cases had personal items, games and toys. We left them alone.

Being in charge of refrigeration as 3rd Engineer, I had keys to the ship’s cold rooms. Over a two hour period, the five of us transferred all stolen items back to the Cold Rooms and changed the locks.

We quietly slipped in all the deck chairs into the right cabins, as it was the norm to keep cabins unlocked. The Captain’s deck chair and a few other chairs went into a secluded part of the Engine Room.

We nailed all the boxes back down.

The next morning 2 launches arrived, one for the baggage and the other for his family. They left the ship.

The next day the signed off Captain made a furious visit to the ship and complained that he had been robbed by somebody on board, as practically all the packing cases were empty. The new Captain just looked at him and coldly told him that “12 large sized cases and 6 suitcases was a bit too much of luggage for a seafarer and, anyway, what was in those cases and what was missing? If you can provide me with a list, I can search all personnel cabins”. The outgoing Captain was stumped and had no answer and he left. (I think it was the Second Mate who had quietly briefed the new Captain about our nocturnal activities.)

He was asked by the Company not to return to SISCO. The Chief Steward was also not recalled when he went on vacation after a few months, for colluding with the last Captain.

Although it was a disagreeable task and left a bad taste in the mouth, I was the whistle blower, who told the visiting Senior Superintendent the details, when we were at anchor in Goa.

Chapter 8 – I get into further trouble with the Chief Engineer due to a Unit overhaul and subsequent damage.

The new Captain was an old SISCO hand. Within a day, the food on board improved to normal Sisco standards. He quickly earned the trust of the Officers, being in total contrast to the previous one.

I could sense that the Chief Engineer was gunning for me, hence I kept a very low profile and walked on egg shells.

It was now around November of 1973. During this time, the seas are sometimes choppy at Marmagoa anchorage. On the ‘Perumai’, we used to avoid immobilizing the Main Engine, as the ship can drag anchor which would require engines at very short notice to correct, all for the safety of the ship.

Sure enough, a few days into the anchorage, the 2nd Engineer brought orders from the Chief Engineer to overhaul one of the Main Engine units, which normally takes about 8 hours. I advised the 2nd Engineer against it and told him “We should have done this alongside the berth at Kandla”. But, as usual, he and the Chief Engineer did not listen to me.

We started the job. One group was working on the cylinder head and another group inside the crankcase. The cylinder head group had to remove the connections for fuel, air and water and use a hydraulic pump to hydraulically open the 12 (or 16?) big sized nuts, lift out the cylinder head using the overhead crane and wait for the crankcase staff to finish their job.

Meanwhile, the crankcase staff had the job of removing the telescopic pipes that carried the cooling water for piston cooling, removing the securing nuts of the stuffing box, open the nuts securing the piston to the cross head block and fit the clamp on the piston rod that would take the stuffing box up when the piston is moved up in the cylinder. The piston is then brought up to its maximum or Top Dead Centre.

The action now shifts to the top, the piston crown top is cleaned, a plate clamp is fitted to the top of the piston, the overhead crane is centered and hooked on to the clamp, after which the piston is slowly and carefully lifted up. As the piston rings come out of the cylinder and into view, each ring is carefully watched to see if it springs outward, which it should. If it does not, it shows that either the ring is broken or is completely stuck due to the build up of carbon.

After the piston is lifted out, the focus shifts to cleaning the liner, removing the carbon from the ports, inspecting and calibrating the liner using the special tool for gauging the liner and, finally, checking the cylinder lubrication. The cylinder head is also cleaned, new gaskets kept ready.

During an overhaul, maximum amount of time is taken to clean the piston, calibrate it, calibrate the new rings, fit the new rings, measure the clearances, dismantle the stuffing box, clean it, calibrate all stuffing box seal and scraper rings, change the worn out rings, calibrate the new seal and scraper rings, assemble the stuffing box on to the piston rod and get the piston ready for lowering.

It so happened that the 2nd Engineer’s wife fell ill and the 2nd Engineer went up to look after her, telling me to take over. I had been apprehensive of the weather ever since the 2nd Mate had told me that the wind was picking up and had not wanted to risk starting the job. But my objections had been overruled.

Usually, the spare piston is always in a state of readiness, calibrated, with new rings fitted and the stuffing box overhauled.

Now that I was in charge, I took steps to reduce the time period that the Main Engine would be immobilized. Since all other jobs could be completed quickly except for cleaning and readying the same piston that had been removed, I decided to shorten the overhaul time by using the spare piston.

So, the spare piston was lowered. Once again the work force was split into 2, the cylinder head group on top and the crankcase group working inside the crankcase.

We were about 30 minutes away from completion, when the Bridge rang down and asked for engines as the wind had picked up and the vessel was dragging anchor. On being told by me that it will take at least another 20 to 30 minutes because we were in the last stages of assembling the unit and the Main Engine was not ready, the new Captain came on the line and asked me why the Main Engine had been immobilised for maintenance without his knowledge.

He was perfectly in the right and justified in asking the question, as any work that would immobilise the Main Engine is discussed by the Chief Engineer with the Master, whether alongside a berth or at an anchorage, after which the Master checks on weather conditions and gives the go ahead. Apparently, the Chief Engineer had not discussed this with the Master, so he was ignorant of the work being done on the Main Engine.

I told the Captain that I had stated my apprehension to the Chief Engineer and 2nd Engineer about opening the Main Engine at anchorage, but I had been overruled. I also told him that I was unaware of his not being in the know things, but would try to expedite the work and give Engines as soon as possible.

In later years, immobilizing the engine would require an official request from the Master for advance permission to be obtained from the Port Authorities, who could, technically, deny us permission.

The Captain was an experienced one. He saw that, with the anchor dragging, our vessel would probably collide with another vessel anchored close by very soon. He called all crew to stations and prepared the windlass for letting go the second anchor. Power to the windlass meant the starting of another generator. I had to reassign staff to start the standby generator, press up the air bottles and be ready for blowing through the engine.

The crankcase job workers came and stated that the job was over. I then told the 4th Engineer, who had been working inside the crankcase, to once again go in, recheck that all was in order, box up the crankcase doors and report back. Meanwhile all the cylinder head jobs had been completed, water opened. Turning gear had been disengaged. The required pumps had been started.

In the interest of safety and quality of work, it is customary not to send the same person who had done the job to recheck. I had made the mistake of doing so. Also, it is customary to have two independent checks to ensure everything is tightened, all tools removed, doors closed etc. Due to the urgency of a dragging anchor and the shortage of time, this was forfeited and not done.

What then transpired was entirely my fault.

I had a Motorman next to me while I was at the Manoeuvring Wheel on the last platform. The 4th Engineer and another Motorman were on the cylinder head platform.

I informed the Bridge that we would be ‘blowing through’ the engine and we need confirmation that the propeller was clear. (Sometimes boats would come very close to the propeller and would get damaged, with loss of life, if the propeller suddenly started rotating). A minute later ‘Propeller Clear’ confirmation was given by the Bridge.

Then I operated the Manoeuvring Wheel to give only air to the engine, with Indicator Cocks open, to execute what was known as an ‘Air Blow’ operation. Air went into the Engine, the Engine turned on air, the ‘pach pach’ sounds of air exiting from the indicator cocks of each cylinder could be heard.

But I had become so acclimatised to each and every sound during every facet of the engine operation, that any different sound would always alert me.

I heard a momentary ‘crack and crunch’ sound, which I felt came from inside the crankcase of the engine. I turned and checked if there was any reaction from the experienced Motorman beside me. There was not even a hint of a lifted eyebrow. I asked him “Did you hear that cracking sound?” He said “No sir, I did not hear anything out of the ordinary”. I just told myself that maybe I was imagining things.

Meantime, the Indicator Cocks were confirmed closed. The standard practice is then to try out the Engine on fuel in the Ahead and Astern directions. The Captain said there was no time for normal trials and wanted movements immediately, as we would be colliding with another vessel in another five to ten minutes.

So I responded to the Telegraph and gave all movements as required. As the engine picked up speed, oil started coming out from all and sundry places on the crankcase doors. I could make out that the crankcase was getting pressurised, but had no choice but to respond to Bridge orders.

About thirty minutes later, the danger of collision had passed, an Astern movement was given and the vessel dropped anchor at a safer and different place. The Captain rang down and thanked me.

But I had to tell him that a problem had occurred and we will need to open the engine again. He said to go ahead as we were safely anchored and away from other vessels.

I informed the 2nd Engineer what I had observed. He came down as I got the crankcase door of the same unit opened. Engaging the turning gear, I turned the engine and found the clamp that is temporarily fitted on to the piston rod to raise the stuffing box was still on the piston rod. It should have been removed once the stuffing box was secured in place.

The hardened mild steel clamp had moved up along with the piston rod, had smashed the cast iron casing of the stuffing box and had bent itself.

The stuffing box is a fitment on the engine that seals the under piston spaces from the crankcase and also prevents the crankcase oil from going into the under piston space. Seal rings prevent air from entering and scraper rings scrape any oil on the piston rod down back into the crankcase.

Once the stuffing box was in pieces, the pressurised air from under piston spaces flowed into the crankcase, pressurising the crankcases also.

Below are some diagrams showing typical Diesel Engine cross section and Stuffing Box arrangement.

A typical Diesel Engine Stuffing Box showing parts.

One of the redeeming features to an absolute catastrophe was the fact that the engine was cold. Had the crankcase been hot, with relatively hot air pressurising the crankcase, all that was required was a hot bearing or a spark to ignite the vapours formed and cause an explosion. We were extremely lucky.

The 2nd Engineer, seeing the damage, called my nemesis, the Chief Engineer, down. He asked me who was responsible for this damage. I told him that I was responsible, as I had taken over charge from the Second Engineer. He asked me to name the Engineer who was working in the crankcase. I told him that I was doing so and whatever had happened was my fault. He told me that he wanted a statement from me, accepting responsibility, by the evening.

We had to now open the unit again and lift out the piston to check for any further damage, apart from the cast iron stuffing box. I also found that the diaphragm ring plate made of cast steel that seats the stuffing box, was bent. These surfaces had to be ‘true’, otherwise they would not ‘mate’ and seal. We could straighten the cast steel diaphragm but had no means of checking if the surface was true. So, we could not box back the piston.

In the interim, in case the Main Engine was needed, a 10 mm mild steel plate was cut, holes drilled and fitted to seal the under piston space from the crankcase. The piston had already been removed, so we cut out the fuel to that unit. The scavenge and exhaust ports were blanked, as were the cooling water and air flanges / pipes.. Now the engine could be started in an emergency, but with 8 units working instead of the usual nine.

I forgot to mention that, following the debacle of the Emergency Fire Pump incident in Kandla, the Ship’s Senior Superintendent had come from Chennai and visited the ship the previous day. He had spoken to many of us, including me, when he asked me the details of what transpired in Kandla. He also made me show him what I had done to rectify the ‘Fuel timing’ fault on the Diesel Engine of the Emergency Fire Pump. I think it went out later as a circular to all ships.

He had gone back ashore the same evening and was residing in a hotel in Goa.

The Chief Engineer wanted him to come to the ship immediately, which he did. He was apprised of the situation and given my written statement accepting responsibility for the damage caused to the Main Engine. The damaged part was immediately sent ashore for straightening and ‘truing’.

Then a formal investigation was started. In the meantime, the 4th Engineer had been insistently telling me that he would accept responsibility as he had been working in the crankcase and he had slipped up. I told him to keep quiet because I anticipated what trend the investigation by the Superintendent would take.

The Superintendent, the Captain and the Chief Engineer were together. The 2nd Engineer was called and he placed the responsibility solely on me, as he had not been in the Engine Room during the overhaul. The Chief Engineer insisted that I be sacked. I was called. The Super asked me to name the person who was working in the crankcase, as it was obvious that I was supervising the work on the cylinder head.

He was very insistent that I name the person who was working inside the crankcase. I reiterated, again, that I accepted responsibility, stood my ground and told all of them that if there was anyone to blame, I was the one. This grilling went on for nearly an hour but I was steadfast.

I must state, for the record, that I was very obstinate in those days and also completely honest, largely to a fault.

Suddenly the whole thing turned on its head. The Superintendent turned around and told the Chief Engineer and the 2nd Engineer “You are both very senior officers who do not want to accept responsibility for what your juniors have done and, instead, blatantly put the blame on the 3rd Engineer for a small and inconsequential damage, whereas the 3rd Engineer is taking the responsibility for the damage, when it is obvious that it is one of his juniors who slipped up. Firstly, you should have listened to him when he advised you not to open the unit, in order to keep the Main Engine ready for any emergency. Secondly, you should have consulted the Captain before working on the Main Engine. You failed in your responsibility and now you want to blame the 3rd Engineer? I will not entertain any request to sack him”.

He further told the Chief Engineer in front of the Captain, 2nd Engineer and me “You should be ashamed of yourself. First it was the Kandla incident involving an MMD Surveyor, where the Company was put to shame. Now this, where all a Chief Engineer had to say was that some damage occurred in the hurry to get the Engine ready, due to dragging anchor and we would have had nothing to say”.

With that, the Superintendent left the ship and quiet descended on the ship. The damaged diaphragm plate was received back next day after repairs. I got it fitted back, assembled the unit, went through the formality of double checking that all was in order, taught my juniors at every point, ‘blew through’ and tried out the Main Engine and went on to other jobs.

The whole incident, of course, rankled the Chief Engineer and by no means made my life any easier.

Chapter 9 - The power of ‘Propelling Time’

To go for an exam, an Engineer needs 2 things. First is the ‘Article Time’ which is the time spent on the ship on ‘Ship’s Articles’. This is entered into the ‘Continuous Discharge Certificate’ or CDC, where dates are recorded on when and where a seafarer joins the ship and when and where he ‘signs off’ a ship and an entry whether the voyages were foreign going or coastal. This entry has the Ship’s Stamp and the Master’s signature. It also has 2 other columns that usually go under the radar, the columns being ‘For Ability’ and ‘For Conduct’. Both are customarily entered with ‘VG’ signifying ‘Very Good’.

In those days, a Master can state anything he wanted in the ‘Comments’ column and ruin the life of the seafarer, but he has to provide documentation to the Shipping Master on such entries. But these columns were later done away with, because of shipboard vendettas being taken out on seafarers through these remarks, without substantiation.

Many seafarers had also gone to court on these matters, which then dragged the Captain, the Company and the Shipping Master to the witness box. So, they did not show up in later versions of the Continuous Discharge Certificate. The CDC is a document issued by the Mercantile Marine Department and is an official record of the sea farer’s service at sea. This is recognized by all countries that are members and a signatory to the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

The second thing an Engineer needs (or had needed) for an exam was a Certificate of ‘Propelling Time’. This was a Company printed form which had entry columns for the number of days that the propeller was turned, ie the Main Engine was running. This was scrupulously kept track of, as it had to be a total of 365 days before one is eligible for the Chief Engineer’s exam. The other columns of ‘Ability’ and ‘Conduct’ were mere formalities of VG and VG, but could be stated differently by a devious Chief Engineer who had an axe to grind with that Engineer. This would cause problems for the Engineer when appearing for the exams, sometimes leading to the Chief Engineer having to appear before the MMD Surveyor to prove his grade lessening remarks with documentation. So, almost all the Chief Engineers would avoid the legal hassles and enter ‘VG’ and ‘VG’.

In a way, I was at the mercy of the Chief Engineer for my Propelling Time Certificate, where he can give an adverse remark. I was hoping that he would sign off soon and another Chief would join. But life can get more and more complicated and did, as events would prove, for me.

Chapter 9 – A Voyage into Danger through Stupidity

We completed loading at Goa and sailed out, with Constanza as our destination. Once again a voyage around Cape Aegulas, across the Cape of Good Hope, we reached Las Palmas in Canary Islands belonging to Spain, bunkered and took on fresh provisions. The food on board had improved remarkably, with the same Chief Cook and the same Chief Steward in charge. It was not necessary anymore to keep a hawk's eye on the quality of provisions supplied. An honest and very good Captain was at the helm.

I was keeping a low profile and doing my job as efficiently and as quietly as possible. Church mice could have learnt a few lessons from me. I had already started my studies and taking my notes. I now had to think of what I would do as Chief Engineer, as the exam that I will be appearing was for my First Class Part ‘A’ and First Class Part ‘B’ Certificates to qualify me for Chief Engineer’s post.

So the routine became keeping my 12~4 watch, going up at 0400h, have some chapathis and egg burji made by my Motorman who would go up about half an hour earlier. The 2nd Mate used to join me for this early breakfast, all with some juices, milk and cheese.

This was called the ‘Graveyard Watch’. One had to keep reminding oneself that only 5 people were awake on board and were responsible for those who were sleeping.

After watch and sleeping for about 5 hours, I had the habit of going down once again at around 0930H and helping the 2nd Engineer in the maintenance of various machinery.

After the 12 to 1600 watch, I used to hand over to the 2nd Engineer, go up and, on good weather days, go for a run on deck. There were not many enthusiasts for playing table tennis, hence the run. Except when rounding South Africa, most were good weather days. Dinner, in uniform, at 6pm was when I met most of the others on board. By about 1900H I used to be fast asleep only to be woken up at 2330H for my watch. It was a set routine.

Two watches out after departure Las Palmas, there was a hint of a piston crack, as had happened on the ‘Chennai Perumai’ nearly 2 years ago. I taught the 4th Engineer who was keeping watch with me what I was looking at and what I was looking for, so that he also could be alert. I waited for one more watch and found it gradually worsening and showing all the classic symptoms.

At 4pm, when the 2nd Engineer took over the watch, I told him what I suspected, showed him what I had observed, advised him of the symptoms that were evident and the necessity to stop engines, check and change the damaged piston. He panicked and immediately called the Chief Engineer down, while I went out of the Engine Room, as I did not want to confront him. I do not know what transpired after I left between the 2nd and Chief, but I bore the brunt of some derision during that evening’s dinner.

Of course it had to be the Chief Engineer. At the dining table, in front of all the Officers and the cadets he stated “I think this 3rd Engineer is losing his mind. He is coming up with impossible scenarios about damage to the engine” and he laughed. Apart from the 2nd Engineer, nobody knew what was going on. I kept my mouth shut, finished my dinner and went to bed.

During the night watch, I noticed that the Expansion Tank water loss was gradually increasing, the water was becoming a shade darker, the exhaust temperature of the suspected unit (I remember it was # 4 unit) was decreasing slowly, the butterfly valve lever on the piston cooling was giving a slight thump – all the classic symptoms of a cracked piston were evident.

Once again I pointed all this out to the 2nd Engineer when he took over watch at 4am. He listened patiently and said that he will discuss this with the Chief in the morning. When I woke up at 1130H, I noticed that the Main Engine was still running.

I went down for my noon watch and continued monitoring the deterioration. Once again I brought this to the attention of the 2nd Engineer at 1600H and told him “At least let us stop and check”. He was irritated with me and told me to go up.

I forgot to mention that there were no more 'special' breakfasts, lunches or dinners for the Captain and Chief Engineer, the practice having stopped after the new Captain had joined.

Dinner time brought more derision from the Chief Engineer, as he had been brought up to date on my prognosis by the 2nd Engineer, including the advice to stop and check. The Chief was even more scathing saying “3rd Engineer is finding holes everywhere. He needs to go home soon”. A few of the Officers laughed rather nervously, not really understanding what was going on. I was red faced and walked out.

During the night watch I saw that things were getting worse, but I kept my mouth shut when handing over watch at 0400H to the 2nd Engineer. By this time, not only was the piston crown deteriorating in my estimation, but my relationship with the 2nd Engineer was also deteriorating. He was not strong enough to stand up to a domineering Chief Engineer. I remained silent, handed over the watch, went up, had something to eat and went to sleep.

At around 9am. I woke up feeling that something was wrong. Then I realised there was no vibration and the Main Engine had stopped. I knew what had happened but did not go down immediately because of the way I had been treated. 10 minutes down the line, my conscience smote me and I changed into a boiler suit and went down to help. I saw everybody in a panic, including the 2nd and Chief. When I asked the 2nd Engineer what was happening, he said in a panic “Water is coming out of the exhaust spaces, out of the scavenge spaces and everywhere. We don’t know where it is coming from”.

I got annoyed and told him and the Chief, who was also there,

“I have been telling you for the last 3 days that # 4 piston crown is cracked and you have not listened to me”. They both got angry with me saying “You and your bloody theories”. It was the end of my patience.

I told them “As things are, you both don’t know what to do and have been running around like headless chickens. Give me 2 minutes and I will prove to you what you are calling ‘my bloody theory’”.

I then got the turning gear engaged, shut off the piston cooling water to # 4 unit, got the kidney shaped scavenge port inspection door on the fuel pump side open, turned the engine till the top of # 4 crown came into view, told the 2nd to climb the ladder, hold a torch and watch the crown while I got the piston cooling water opened.

In the meantime, because I had got the piston cooling water shut off, the water leakages from scavenge and exhaust spaces had diminished drastically, which indicated to them that I was on the right track.

The 2nd Engineer, who had been looking into the combustion space, saw a fountain of water come out of the hole in the crown when I got the piston cooling water opened. Only then did the two doubting idiots agree with me.

Their next question was “What do we do now” as there were numerous phone calls from the Bridge asking for Engines immediately, on an emergency basis. At that time, we did not know what the situation was on the Bridge.

With me instructing others, it took me two minutes to cut out the fuel pump of the unit, stop the water to that unit, increase cylinder lubrication to that unit, ‘blow through’ the engine on air to dispel the accumulated water in the engine and inform the Bridge that we were ready for engine movements. Immediately a ‘Full Ahead’ movement was given and we were under way again, albeit with one cylinder less. Having done exactly this on numerous occasions on the 'Chennai Perumai", it was literally a mental 'checklist' that needed to be ticked off.

On my advice to the 2nd Engineer, the Chief asked the Captain to anchor at a safe place for about 8 to 9 hours work on the main Engine. We anchored. (I think it was close to Ceuta). The job of changing the holed piston was completed in about 7 hours.

We resumed our voyage.

I had a bath, changed and went for dinner. Suddenly, there was silence and no derisive comments targeted at me. The silence continued till after dessert.

That was the time when the Captain put his spoon down, looked around and said “Chief Engineer, Chief Mate why have you become silent? Go on, laugh at the 3rd Engineer, go on and keep insulting him”. He was very angry and showed his anger.

“Do you all know what was happening when the Engine stopped? We were in the traffic separation zone of Gibraltar Straits, which is one of the densest traffic zones in the world and we had ships behind us, ahead of us and crossing us and we couldn’t manouvre, navigate. We could have had other ships smashing into us. We could have drifted and run aground. We were extremely lucky there was no accident. To make things worse, when I came down to the Engine Room, I saw that for more than 20 minutes you all had no idea of what was happening or how to deal with it. After the 3rd Engineer came down, you both still did not believe him till he became exasperated and took matters into his own hands. It was only after that that some semblance of order was restored. Within 10 minutes the engine was ready and we could move. How is it that you chose to ignore his findings for nearly 3 days without investigating? All you had to do was stop when we were in a safe area in the open sea and at least check, if you wanted so much to prove the 3rd Engineer wrong. But no, you wanted to smear him because you did not like him and your ego did not allow you to even think that he may have been right. I regret having come to this ship and sailing with such people as you.”

Turning to me, the Captain said “Thank you for saving the ship. You also should not be sailing with such people. I am recommending to the Company that you be transferred and promoted”.

After this incident, I spent a quiet few months on board before I was signed off at Bombay (Mumbai) on 16th May 1974, told to go home for a short period and be ready to join a newly bought 2 year old ship in 2 or 3 weeks. Even then, the Chief Engineer tried to have the last laugh - he refused to give me my 'Propelling Time' Certificate. When I informed the Captain, he took a sheet off the book of the printed form and, using a previous certificate as template, typed out the form, signed it and stamped it with the Master's and Ship's stamp. In the 'Comments' section, he had written "The Chief Engineer has gone on short leave, due to a family emergency, hence, as Master, I am issuing this "Propelling Time' Certificate.'

End of story.

Chapter 10 – What I learnt from my experiences on the Chennai Ookam – what were the takeaways

First and foremost, I learnt to strongly back my convictions with courage.

Learn to trust your instincts. You will be right at least 90% of the time, if not more.

You may not be a genius but many a time you will have to sail with disagreeable people, where you may just have to shut up and lie low.

Do not allow your ego to overcome your professionalism and intelligence. Your dislike of one person may cloud your judgement enough to throw out all his suggestions and advice, like throwing out the baby with the bath water.

Listen to your staff, even if of the lowest rank. They may know something or seen something that you have never experienced before.

Do not put the ship’s safety into jeopardy because you think you know everything, but are actually ignorant.

Live with the fact that there are quite a number of others who are much more intelligent than you, more experienced than you. Learn from them.

Do not stop learning. Have a motto of ‘Learn at least one new thing every day’.

Rangan

===== Continued in Blog 35 - A Change of Ship and a Change of Engine =====