Blog 132 - mv Dali - Possible Scenarios
- ranganathanblog
- Apr 24, 2024
- 21 min read
MV Dali - Possible Scenarios
This is a sequel to my Blog 131 - “MV Dali crashes into Baltimore Bridge”. This time around, many scenarios are discussed in detail, analysed and each one ‘rated’.
Facts as we know them
Ship Particulars
300mL x 48mW x 15mD
116,851 tons DWT x 9971 TEU capacity
Main Engine 9 Cyl MAN B&W 9S90ME C9.2
41,480 KW - 556300hp - 82.5 rpm
Service Speed 22 knots
Bow Thruster 3000 kw
2 Nos. 3,840 kw Generators
2 Nos. 4,400 kw Generators
Total 4 Auxiliary Diesel Generators
Builder - Hyundai Heavy Industries, Ulsan, S. Korea
Yard No. 2678
Completed 05th March 2015
IMO No. 9697428
Singapore Flagged, Owner Grace Ocean under Synergy Marine Group who are Owner and Manager
Recent Voyage Activities
06th Feb Zhangzhou - Bunkered, details unknown
09th Feb Zhoushan - Again bunkered, details unknown
20th Feb 2024 Busan - Bunkered again, details unknown
Passed through Panama Canal
She calls New York, Norfolk and Baltimore
On 19th March 2024 till 21st AM early hours, vessel was in New York.
‘Centerline’ provided bunkers on 19th March 2024 - MGO and Very Low Sulfur Fuel oil. The former is used in port and the latter at sea.
Note - Both fuels were tested for contaminants twice - once at the Terminal - again at the time of delivery to the Dali.
No statement as to what contaminants they were tested for and how.
Difficult to believe that there was an 'on board' test for contaminants, at the time of delivery to the ship, as vessels do not carry very many laboratory instruments for checks of fuels, except a viscometer, a hydrometer and thermometer. The temperature is checked, the viscosity is measured for that particular temperature and interpolated for 40 deg C, the hydrometer being used to measure density and interpolated for 15 deg C. All this is occasionally done while the bunkers are going on.
While Alongside in Baltimore
Maintenance Work carried out on Main Engine.
One stevedore reported that vessel had one - maybe two - ‘blackouts’, as many Reefer Containers tripped and had to be reset manually. Not confirmed by any other source.
After Departure Baltimore, Proceeding in Channel
Due to the heavy electrical load of reefer containers, Bow Thruster, two steering motors, air compressors, winches etc., all 4 generators must have been running when they left the dock.
After entering the channel, they would have taken the Bow Thruster off load and stopped one Generator, may be even two.
1.24:33 - All lights go out, All power lost.
1.25:31 - (About a minute later) Lights flicker back on; black smoke from funnel, which was evidence of a generator being started about a minute or less before the sighting of black smoke.
Monkey Island Navigational Light can be seen on
1.26:37 - Goes dark again
1.27 - The Dali appears to be colliding with the Bridge
1.27:10 - The ship’s lights come back on
1.29 - Bridge collapses
1.29:5 - Lights go off again
22 crew on board at the time of collision
What all reasons can be conjectured
It is definitely not a Main Engine failure, as power failure can be ascribed to Generators, not the Main Engine. (There is no shaft generator fitted).
Power outage can be because of something common to all 4 Generators. (The 4 generators are pretty massive, to cater to the {possible} 1000 Reefer Containers + large capacity machinery).
Can the Blackout be caused by a failed Cooling Pump or Lub Oil Pump?
a. Common Cooling Pumps - Fresh Water or Sea Water Pumps. But this is not likely - the ‘Standby’ Pump would have started automatically and come on line as soon as the pressure of the first pump starts dropping. Unless the ‘Standby’ pumps were not kept on ‘Standby’ for some reason - it could have been opened for maintenance, change of shaft seal etc. Which, again, is improbable as no Chief Engineer in his right mind will sail out in that condition.
b. Lub Oil Pumps : Most Generators come with attached Lub Oil pumps. The failure of the attached LO pump will definitely shut down that engine.
Can the Generators be overloaded and be the cause of a Black Out?
c. If (b) happened, and two generators were running at that time, it could have caused an overload on the single remaining generator and caused a black out.
d. Let us examine a hypothetical situation where a human error could have occurred in the following manner: The third generator load is reduced and shared with the other two running Generators. The Third generator is now taken off the bus bars and is running idle. In today's systems, shift of loads from one generator to the other two is done automatically, through the press of a button. It can also be done manually, but all prefer the automatic option. When it is time, after a few minutes of cooling down, to shut down and stop the third idle generator, the engineer, by mistake, presses the ‘Stop’ button and stops one of the generators on load, instead of pressing the ‘Stop’ button on the generator that was idling.
e. This spikes the load on the remaining generator causing a black out.
(During the 38 years at sea, I have been witness to the very same human error having occurred at least 7 times, luckily with no worrying consequences.
To reduce the possibility of human error, I had introduced a ‘double check’, using another engineer to cross check. But, with drastically reduced manning, this ‘double check’ became an impossibility as the years went by.)
Hypothetically, what would have been the load on the Generators at Departure Baltimore?
f. To go more into details - on departure:
Bow Thruster consumes about 2500 kw
Expect 10% of capacity of 9900 TEUs to be Reefer Containers, say 1000TEUs. Vessel carrying (maybe) about 700 Reefers @ 5 kw average per TEU = 3500 kw (varies with some cutting off and some cutting in).
Engine Room Machinery = 2500 kw
Deck machinery = 1000 kw (squaring up activities for’d and aft)
Accommodation + others = 1000 kw
The total load is likely to have been around 10,500 kw at departure.
It would mean that all 4 Generators were running at departure.
Less 2500 kw after stopping bow thruster, then one of the smaller generators is stopped.
After a while, the huge Air Compressors stop, ER load comes down to 1800 kw.
Winches have stopped, lessening the load by about 300 kw.
Total load now is around 6600 kw.
The two large sized generators (4400 kw each) is sufficient for now for the ship’s needs.
The second small generator (3800 kw) is taken off load.
The normal practice, once a generator is off loaded, it is run idle for about 10 minutes before being stopped.
By mistake, if the on-load generator ‘Stop’ button is pressed, then the single running generator (4400 kw) is overloaded with 6500 kw and shuts down, causing the black out.
g. Worth checking if there had been a crew change in Baltimore, especially the Third Engineer or - as some companies have it - the 2nd Asst Engineer (as, logically, he would have been on duty in the Engine Room during maneuvering).
Switch Board Failure?
h. Switchboard failure of one generator’s control panel can have the same effect, a black out.
i. Failure of the whole switch board cannot be the likely cause, as the smoke reveals that one generator was started. (Black smoke from funnel). All lights coming on for a minute, including deck lighting and foc’sle lighting, means the generator was loaded on to the main bus bars.
j. Chances of overheating of the Bus Bars and circuit breakers is a probability, but very remote. A look at the ‘Temperature Strips’ that adorn all Bus Bars will reveal the change in colour of the Temperature Strip if the Bus bars were overheated.
A subsidiary question would be - was the Engine Control Room Air Conditioning running properly at that time.
k. Could the Black Out have occurred during change over from Diesel Oil to Heavy Fuel Oil
The change over systems of FO to DO to FO are separate for Generators and for Main Engine.
As mandated, the vessel is not supposed to change fuels in the proximity of the port.
Even if they did, the logical sequence would have been to change the fuel of the Main Engine, not the Generator.
When changing over from Diesel Oil to HFO, the procedure to be followed is to heat the Diesel Oil slowly and, at around 60 deg C or less (depending on the Diesel Oil characteristics), turn the change over cock to HFO, when heated HFO at around 85 deg C enters the system, mixing with the Diesel Oil in the line in ever increasing quantity.
Practically, if the heating of the Diesel Oil is too rapid, there is a chance of Gasification and the Diesel Oil turns to vapour and does not flow to the generator, causing a black out.
Why did the second black out take place?
l. The generator that was started (after the first blackout) would have been sufficient to power all the necessary ‘Standby’ pumps for Main Engine operation. The ‘Non essentials’ would have tripped, including power to Reefer Containers.
m. In which case, a second black out should not / would not have happened.
n. They could not have been starting to change over to HFO, as they have to clear certain borders before doing so, ship’s position at the time of change over is supposed to be logged. If they had done so - starting to change over to HFO - they may have heated the fuel too quickly for the generators before the change over, which could have caused a vapour lock and a black out.
After changing to HFO, a timer comes into play, which regulates rate of rise of the temperature of the fuel oil.
The chances of HFO not heated enough and which reaches the Generators, can cause black smoke, but may not cause a black out.
o. With all of the above, if (b) or (c) or (d) or (k) did not take place, we have to look for the cause elsewhere.
p. Minutely examining the print out of the Alarms’ Record, one can pinpoint the origin of the problem that caused the black out. It would be the first of the series of alarms that followed that would be the prime suspect.
Exploring Fuel Related Issues
Being in a US Port, both Main Engine and Generators would have been on MDO or MGO.
Had they bunkered MDO or MGO recently, which they had just started consuming in Baltimore? Did they start using this MDO or MGO immediately?
Had the ship experienced blackouts whilst alongside in Baltimore? Once again, the Alarms’ Printout will be the best indicator.
Did they experience a sudden drop in fuel pressure to the Generators any time while they were alongside?
If all the 4 of the above are checked +ve, then we are definitely looking at a fuel based issue.
Exploring Filters used on Generator Fuel Circuits
Expect there will be one of two types of filters, either the mesh type or the candle type.
The mesh type filter will have a certain micron size and will filter solid contaminants in the MDO up to the specified micron size, allowing the smaller particles to pass through.
3. Mesh type filters are easier to clean and are cleaned quickly. The assembly also is capable of being opened and boxed up quickly - in a maximum of two minutes - using a clean, spare filter.
4. Normally, there are two such identical filters, one in use, one on standby.
5. If they are ‘Auto Clean’ filters, they will have an internal cleaning mechanism that will clean the filter either based on a timer or differential pressure. With clean fuels, only the timer will operate to clean the filter so many times a day. If the self cleaning is on the basis of differential pressure, it means the contaminants are more and the number of ‘self cleanings’ per day will have increased.
6. A counter, which is logged at least every 24 hours, shows if the ‘self cleaning’ has increased in a 24 hour period.
7. These filters take longer to clean when dismantled. They also have a ‘push button’ to initiate cleaning immediately.
8. Both of the above types, the basket type mesh filters and the ‘Auto Clean’ filters can be changed over and cleaned quickly, the former manually and the latter by means of the press button.
9. Candle Type filters have come more into vogue with deterioration of fuel quality. They are more efficient than the mesh filters in filtering contaminants. But they also have their drawbacks.
Exploring Fuels and Contaminants
Common contaminants in marine fuel include asphaltenes, hydrogen sulfide, sulfur, nitrogen, carbon, vanadium, nickel, aluminum silicate, water, ash, sediments, used lubricating oil, and microbes, including yeast, fungi, and bacteria. (From azosensors.com).
Fortunately, most of the solid contaminants + water are removed through Purifiers. Modern day Purifiers are extremely efficient.
A typical Laboratory Analysis of Diesel Oil will specify the following:
Density
Viscosity
Water %
Carbon Residue
Sulphur Content
Vanadium %
Sodium %
Aluminium %
Silicon %
Flash Point
Pour Point
Calculated carbon Aromaticity
A more detailed analysis, if specified by contract between the Ship Operator and the Laboratory would include
None of the Analysis Reports mention tests for Paraffin Content or Acid Content or Lub Oil content.
Analysing the Possibilities of contaminated Diesel Oil in the Black Out(s)
If the - unconfirmed - reports of Reefer Containers tripping were true and had to be reset, the vessel was, most likely, experiencing
Non essentials either tripping of their own accord, which would happen if the Generators are overloaded or they were purposely tripped to bring down the running loads of the Generators.
This, most likely, points to a fuel related problem, flow of fuel to the Generator being less than what it should be.
The ‘Alarm Recorder’ would show a “Fuel Oil Pressure to D/G Low”.
On this alarm being initiated, the Engineer’s first reaction would be to reduce the load on the Generators by tripping the “Non Essentials” breaker, by which the Reefer Containers circuit breakers would have tripped, and there would have been no power supply to the Reefers.
If the - unconfirmed - reports of Black Outs taking place when alongside is true, and the actually sighted Black Outs before collision with the Bridge, the vessel could have been experiencing fuel related problems on the Generators.
Paraffins
One of the contaminants that does not show up on any Lab Analysis Reports - mostly because the fuel or diesel oil is not analysed for this ingredient - are paraffins. All Heavy Fuel Oils, Diesel Oils, Gas Oils contain paraffins to a varying degree, sometimes in high quantities.
Another contaminant that is not analysed in the Fuel Labs is the presence of dirty Lubricating Oils, illegally dumped into the Diesel Oil tanks ashore. The presence of this dirty lub oil in the Diesel Oil actually shows up in the purification process of the Diesel Oil - the purifiers will overflow several times. This overflowing is a dead giveaway if noted.
But this lub oil in the Diesel Oil is unlikely to cause a trip - the smoke from the generator is likely to be continuously black.
Heavy Fuel Oil is not affected by the presence of paraffins, whether in large quantities or small, as the paraffins - which are like wax at room temperatures - turn into a liquid due to heating of the HFO to around 135 deg C and, as such, are carried into the Fuel Oil stream.
The melting point of paraffins varies from 48 deg C to 68 deg C.
The temperature of HFO at the ‘Hot’ Filter is close to 135 deg C.
The problem starts when the paraffins content is high in MDO or MGO, both of which are never heated.
When passing through filters on line, it chokes up the filters very quickly.
If they are mesh filters, it takes a while for the mesh’ to get completely choked, leaving time enough to change over to the ‘standby’ filter and clean the choked one. Time taken to remove and change mesh filters is a matter of minutes.
If they are ‘Candle’ filters, the pores of the filter get choked up quickly and no amount of ‘self cleaning’ will help.
Changing over to the ‘standby’ filter does not help, as the ‘standby’ filter also gets clogged very fast.
It takes time to open the covers of the casing of the candle filters, unscrew them and replace them with clean elements. The fastest it can be done is in about 15 minutes.
Vessels normally carry about 3 sets of spare ‘candle’ filters.
By then, the ‘standby’ filter gets choked.
No fuel reaches the Generators and they trip.
Black out occurs.
Cleaning these ‘candle’ filters when the pores are choked with wax like paraffins is not easy. They need to be soaked for hours in kerosene.
The fastest way of cleaning them is to apply a soft flame to melt the wax.
Vessel uses up all spare ‘candle’ elements in no time.
Emergency Generator:
All visual (video) indications are that the Emergency Generator started, as seen by the presence of the Mast Navigation Light and some of the Accommodation lights. . It came on a minute after the first black out and remained on after the second black out, before being obscured by the girders of the bridge.
The Navigation Mast Light can be seen to the right of the smoke from funnel. Other accommodation lights can also be seen at a time when a generator has just been started and has not been put on load.
Acids
Another contaminant that goes largely unreported, is the presence of acids in the MDO or MGO.
Acids enter the MDO or MGO when added to fuel tanks ashore by unscrupulous Mafia, who get rid of industrial waste acids by adding it to the large sized tanks ashore.
Acids - even the smallest of quantities - will eat the finely machined surfaces of the fuel pump plunger and barrel, making them ineffective for pumping fuel.
I have had a sister vessel sink in rough weather mid Atlantic, after the vessel lost all power, most likely due to diesel oil contaminated with acids.
Prior bunkering Diesel Oil, when the bunker barge ullages are checked, putting a few drops of the diesel oil on the back of your palm will indicate presence of any acid, as the skin will burn.
Hypothetical Sequence of Events And Their Ratings
Most likely scenario - Rating 9 of 10 - Excessive quantity of paraffins in the Marine Diesel Oil or Marine Gas Oil.
This choked up the filters, preventing diesel oil from reaching the Generators.
One generator then slows down and trips, causing the others to get overloaded and they, in turn, trip.
Black out occurs. (1.24:33)
Generators may have either slowed down to 200 or 300 rpm or they may have stopped.
Even if the remaining Generator is started - (black smoke from funnel at 1.25:31) - the diesel oil in the line is just sufficient to run it for a minute+, during which they put the circuit breaker on.
Lights come on (1.25:31).
Fuel stops coming to this Generator also, as the filters are choked.
The last Generator also trips and stops.
(The Engine Room Alarm Recorder, although having a mass of alarms displayed and printed, will show the proper sequence of events).
2. Rating 5 of 10 : Wrong Generator Stopped - It is not unusual these days to find that extra pressure is there from the Operators on Chief Engineers to reduce overall fuel consumption, especially MDO or MGO.
KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) and, possibly, incentives, play a huge part in a Chief Engineer deciding to stop one or two generators, even before the departure of the Pilots.
With Vessel running on 7 to 8 knots (Half Ahead?) - and not knowing they were going to pass a Bridge - the Chief Engineer asks the Duty Engineer to to take one Generator off load. It is presumed that 3 are running, with the fourth one having been stopped immediately after the Bow Thruster is switched off.
The Duty Engineer off loads the third one, waits a few minutes for the engine to cool and, by mistake, switches off - presses the ‘Stop’ button or turns the 'Toggle Switches' of - a running Generator.
The last running generator trips on overload.
This happens in the proximity of the Bridge.
Before they have time to recover, the collision takes place.
It is worth investigating if a crew change (of Engineers) had taken place in Baltimore.
(If I remember correctly, the left outer switch is the 'Selector Switch' for 1st standby or 2nd Standby. The Black toggle switch is for adjusting frequency. The red toggle switch is for taking a generator 'on load' or 'off load'. The fourth is for checking the lights of indicators. This is an older design. Modern day switchboards have more features, which include remotely starting or stopping of the generator engine from this board itself. It also includes switches to load the generators on to the bus bars automatically, instead of manually.
3. Black out occurs when heating the Diesel Oil too quickly, causing Gasification (in preparation for changing over to HO) - here there are two scenarios:
a. Rating 0 of 10 : If the (unconfirmed) report of the Reefer Containers tripping while alongside is true, it means problems existed before they sailed out.
b. Rating 8 of 10 : Chances are small, as no Chief Engineer in his right mind will risk changing over when well within the limits of a port. But, if he had done so and the Diesel Oil was heated up too quickly, the gasification caused could have shut down all generators in a matter of seconds, leading to the same circumstances as the Dali. With only vapours reaching the generator, the rpm of the generator would have fluctuated, causing a drop in frequency and voltage, which would have led to a trip.
4. Rating 2 of 10 : Acids in the Diesel or Gas Oil - With high Generator loads and fuel flowing quickly to the Fuel Pumps, the acids could have eaten away the smooth surfaces of the Fuel Pumps pf any or all the Generators.
The Generator that was started at 1.24:31 also may have stopped for the same reason.
If, after the crash, they were able to bring Generators back online, the ‘acid’ theory will not hold up.
If ‘acid’ was the cause, they would not have been able to start any Generator, as the Fuel Pumps would not have been able build up any pressure.
5. Rating 1 of 10: Switchboard too hot, hence all Generators trip -
If the Engine Control Room AC was not functioning, the Switch Board can get hot.
But Baltimore ambient temperature at night would have been around 12 deg C.
If the AC was not working, they would have opened the 4 or 6 air vents provided in the ECR and the cool air from outside - through a branch of one of the ER Blowers - would have been sufficient to cool the entire ECR.
6. Rating 1 of 10: Circuit Breakers Problem -
Most likely the vessel has Hyundai Circuit Breakers - probably licensed from Terasaki.
These modern Circuit Breakers, especially Terasaki, are very reliable.
Even if one gave trouble, the other two would have held.
7. Rating 0 of 10: Cyber Attack -
My expertise in this area is very poor.
A few ships have their data computer connected to the Internet, which automatically send out Noon Reports.
Independent micro processors are used in multiple areas for Engine Room machinery., but I can’t think of a way for a hacker to access them and create a ‘black out’.
But, some of Bridge Systems can be vulnerable, as they depend on GPS.
But no hacker could have caused a ‘black out’ of Generators by hacking into the (more) vulnerable Bridge Systems.
The chances of remotely shutting down generators is practically nil.
8. The Minimum Manning Certificate is totally in favour of the Owner or Operator, to bring down his costs. It does not cater to the increasing complexity of ships.
Ships, Engine Rooms, Main Engines and Auxiliaries have become larger and larger, which means a 4 hour job of yesteryear now can take as much as 8 hours.
Ports may have modernised to cater to larger vessels, but passages and freeways have not kept pace to cater to the larger vessels.
Safety margins and Factor of Safety have become negligible.
Port stays have become shorter and shorter, leaving no time for scheduled maintenance. For a depleted crew, it is a race against time, often leading to mistakes, some proven costly.
The human element has been thrown out of the porthole.
UMS - Unmanned Machinery Spaces - have straightaway given an opportunity for the Owner to reduce manning drastically.
Modern day ships do not give sufficient time to a newly joined staff to acclimatise himself. Within hours of his joining, the ship sails out and he is expected to carry out duties that he may not be familiar with, as each ship is different.
There is no immediate back up of crew or Engineers in the event of an emergency.
The Engine Room is - mostly - manned by a skeleton crew, as everything is on Bridge Control.
The rest are asleep, in order to comply with ‘’Rest Hours” mandate.
More such deadly mishaps - in different forms - are just waiting around the bend, were the same type of manning were to continue.
Final Observations:
Vessel should always carry fuel and diesel oil from a second source, so that it can be used in an emergency and during manouvering. The contaminated oil can be mixed with the good oil in open seas, so as to consume all of it.
Chief Engineers must make ‘Notes of Protests’ in the event if problematical fuels and take it up strongly with the vessel’s Management.
Vessel Management ashore have, over the years, have entered their ivory towers and isolated themselves from meaningful dialogues with the ship’s staff, in order to improve safety, improve conditions, improve relations.
Today, it is more a Master / Slave relations between the Shore Management and the ship’s staff. It is either ‘do it my way or it is the gangway’.
Seafarers are guarding their jobs by kowtowing to any and all instructions received from the Office, whether sound or not.
Fuel consumption and Lubricating Oil consumption is, on most occasions, a point of contention between a Chief Engineer and the Vessel Superintendent. In the past, a Chief Engineer had enough clout to parry the thrust of a Superintendent’s persistence, by explaining, in engineering and nautical terms, actual situations. Example - a cautious Chief Engineer waits for the vessel to drop the pilot, waits for the vessel to clear dense traffic - in close collaboration with the Master - before changing fuels, in order to be ready for any emergency that may occur. The chances of an emergency situation developing may be one to a million, but caution is paramount.
The chances of a ship hitting a Bridge may be one in ten thousand - but it happened.
As per maintenance software, the Chief Engineer has to carry out maintenance work.
But he is not given the time in port to do so.
He does not have the resources, mainly man power, due to reduced manning.
He does not have well trained manpower, as most engineers have not had good training on board in their junior years.
So if a job is normally done in 6 hours, the less trained staff take 10 hours. By the time one of them gains experience, it is time for him to go on leave.
4. In port, when contaminated fuel is found, the Chief Engineer and Master must use their powers and call in the Port State Control and Class. Delays to the ship must not take precedence over a known safety aspect.
5. The Engine Room should be manned by more people, of trusted calibre, during ‘Critical Operations’. The Chief Engineer has the discretionary powers to over ride the Minimum Rest Hours.
6. All Engine Room staff need to be trained in certain critical activities viz. Fuel Filters change over, Change over to Emergency Steering, Start / Stop of Generators locally and remotely etc.
7. Companies have to restructure the manning on board to reflect the realities of modern day shipping.
8. Fuels supplied on board must be thoroughly analysed by a neutral laboratory before being supplied to the ship, instead of a post-supply bland analysis that “The Fuel Conforms to the specifications”.
9. This clearly, in my understanding, means that somebody is specifying what specification of oil is to be supplied.
Is the person making that specification - 90% of the time the ‘Charterer’ - qualified in Fuel Oil Technology to make such specification for vessels?
Does he - or his division - hold an ISO Certificate to do so?
Have they been audited by Class?
10. Good quality fuel is available in the market. Let us be kind enough to the marine fraternity to, at least, give them good fuel to begin with. They are already working with one hand tied behind their backs.
11. Let the authorities and Ship Managers get together to improve working conditions on board, instead of keeping them under sustained pressure.
12. As per every ‘Safety Management System’, the Master of the ship is the absolute authority for all decisions. If a snap survey is taken today of all Masters - “do they feel that they are the decision makers and do they feel they are in authority” - a very surprising result will become evident.
13. The present trend of Ship Operators and Managers is to take refuge in the ‘SMS’ documents, whenever an on-board problem has gone public and throw the on-board seafarer under the bus or under the keel.
14. A calamitous ending may have started off and could have had its genesis in a very innocuous requisition made months ago and yet-to-be supplied to the ship by the Superintendent.
I will elaborate an incident in this regard.
I joined a ship which had a Controllable Pitch Propeller.
We sailed out within two hours of my joining.
During the five days of sailing (in the North Sea), I saw that one of the two hydraulic pumps for the CPP had been dismantled completely, awaiting essential spares for nearly nine months.
During that era, there were two CPP manufacturers, LIPS and KaMeWa.
In the event of loss of hydraulic pressure, one of the CPPs reacts by taking the blade angle to ‘Full Ahead’ pitch.
The other type brings the blade pitch to ‘zero’.
My question to the Engineers was “What would you do if the second hydraulic pump also fails”?
There were no answers.
We reached a Norwegian port for loading.
Checking the manual, we had an alternative - that of hand pumping hydraulic oil and locking the piston in the propeller hub mechanism, so that the blades go to ‘Full Ahead’ pitch and stays there, whereafter the Main Engine can be reversed, as done normally on most ships.
But, to my surprise, the CPP did not shift to the ‘Full Ahead’ blade angle, due to a - suspected - seal ring in the mechanism, which could only be renewed in dry dock.
The result? If the second hydraulic pump also fails and we get stuck in mid sea, we would have had no other option but to call for a tow.
All this in the North Sea winter, where Force 9 winds were common and the seas high and a very stiff ship (because of a cargo of steel pellets), the ship itself being a ‘Laker’ - long in length and narrow in beam. (One could see her decks 'flexing' considerably and repeatedly when taking on the waves).
Solution? We needed the spares for the dismantled hydraulic pump immediately in order to have a ‘standby’ hydraulic pump.
When informed, the Vessel Superintendent said that it will take another two weeks more to supply the spares. We had already waited for 9 months. His reasoning was that the previous Chief Engineer did not make any ruckus during his 8 month tenure and I could easily wait for 2 more weeks.
I strongly disagreed and said that I am not going to take the same risk that the previous Chief Engineer had taken in running with no ‘standby’ for the CPP.
I insisted that we were not going to sail out of this port without the second hydraulic pump running.
A day later, on completion of loading, we went out to anchorage and waited.
18 hours later, the spares arrived.
6 hours later, the pump was assembled, tried out.
We sailed out.
I sent out an emergency requisition for a second set of spares.
As a postscript, the first pump failed two months later.
15. In the above incident, who is to blame if the vessel loses its hydraulic power and pitch control and the vessel sinks in bad weather?
16. In the above incident, who is to blame had the vessel lost her pitch and she collides with another vessel or collides with a Bridge, like mv Dali?
17. Almost all incidents / accidents of a ship has its genesis in some error on somebody’s part - on board or ashore.
18. The poor seafarer gets blamed by all and sundry.
19. Safety being paramount, Chief Engineers and Masters should stand up and say 'no' to the Management in the event of the Management's decision to try to implement a dangerous factor. The law is on our side.
Summary of the most likely scenarios:
A) Rating 9 of 10 : Paraffins choking up the fuel filters. Almost certainly the cause if vessel had problems when alongside.
B) Rating 8 of 10 : If Vessel had started changing over the Generators to HFO, gasification caused by heating up the Diesel Oil too fast - possible scenario.
C) Rating 5 of 10: Wrong Generator stopped.
Videos Consulted:
Rangan
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