Blog 110 == ISO 9000 == International Safety Management Code == Safety Management Systems

ISO Standards (9000+++) and the ISM Code

"Marine Musings 37"

ISO 9000, 9001 and the ISM Code

At the outset, I would like to state that, at present, I am not an expert on the ISM Code. But there was once a time my contemporaries on board considered me as the leading man with respect to all things SMS and asked me to prepare the vessel for an audit, internal and external.

The numerous hours and days and weeks spent in educating all staff about the various aspects of the Safety Management Systems of the particular ship / company that I was contracted for, gave me a good insight into its myriad aspects.

So, having been the victim / beneficiary of its tenets for a decade and having been the end user, I reserve the right to comment on the many aspects of the Code that affected me.

On ISO 9000:

Quote

ISO 9000 is defined as a set of international standards on quality management and quality assurance developed to help companies effectively document the quality system elements needed to maintain an efficient quality system. They are not specific to any one industry and can be applied to organizations of any size.

ISO 9000 can help a company satisfy its customers, meet regulatory requirements, and achieve continual improvement. It should be considered to be a first step or the base level of a quality system.

Unquote

On the ISM Code:

Quote

ISM Code

The purpose of the ISM Code is to provide an international standard for the safe management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention.

The Assembly had already invited all Governments, by resolution A.443(XI), to take the necessary steps to safeguard the ship master in the proper discharge of his responsibilities with regard to maritime safety and the protection of the marine environment.

In resolution A.680(17), the Assembly recognized the need for appropriate organization of management to enable it to respond to the need of those on board ships in order to achieve and maintain high standards of safety and environmental protection.

Recognizing that no two shipping companies or shipowners are the same, and that ships operate under a wide range of different conditions, the Code is based on general principles and objectives, which include assessment of all identified risks to one Company’s ships, personnel and the environment and establishment of appropriate safeguards.

The Code is expressed in broad terms so that it can have a widespread application. Clearly, different levels of management, whether shore-based or at sea, will require varying levels of knowledge and awareness of the items outlined.

The cornerstone of good safety management is commitment from the top. In matters of safety and environment protection it is the commitment, competence, attitudes and motivation of individuals at all levels that determines the end result.

Unquote

Previous to the introduction of the ISM Code and its offshoot, the Safety Management System (SMS) manuals of each company, most companies had relied on Circulars to Ships, to outline most duties, including Safety and Service. Sometimes some Companies had clearer sets of Instructions, outlining what the Company wanted the ship and the seafarer to do when faced with a certain set of problems.

But there were many companies where safety standards were very poor and, as a consequence, accidents’ rates high.

The advent of Ship Management Companies in the 1970s and their proliferation in the 1980s meant that the Ship Owner had now distanced himself from the nucleus of ship operation to the extent where he found himself unaware of what is taking place on the ship. He, then, had to rely on a third party’s report for knowledge of his own ship. Depending on the Management Company, this report could be partially truthful or totally fabricated.

Over the years, to my surprise, I found that most of the Ship Owners did not have in their employ, personnel dedicated to the regular inspection of their own ships or the vetting of Management Companies that operated their ships. In order to minimise on their staffing costs, the Owners resorted to appointing third party Surveyors or Auditors to inspect the Management Company and the ship.

Moreover, in order to further reduce costs, Owners resorted to changing the Registry of their ships to what became known as “Flags of Convenience”. Some of the countries that came under the “Flags of Convenience” did not even have the basic governmental infrastructure to cater to the ships registered with them. All they wanted were the fees collected from the Ship Owners on a regular basis.

European Shipping Companies, in the 1970s, found themselves overburdened with running costs, including increasing seafarers’ and staff wages and spiralling infrastructure costs. A number of them eagerly took to the Ship Management idea under the guise of ‘reorganisation’ but in actual fact to buttress the bottom line of their Balance Sheets, where crew costs could be cut by 60 to 70% by using Asian crew. Change of Registry had, perforce, to follow. A dummy corporation would be set up in the country where the ship is registered, thereby distancing themselves even further from the Ownership laws in their own country.

The mid 1980s saw the influx of Japanese company ships into the Management matrix, after a mini collapse in their country’s economy.

The Ship Management market boomed. Management companies mushroomed. Competition was fierce. Although everybody involved - the Owner, the Manager and the ancillaries - were minting money, the competition to acquire more ships for Management forced the Ship Manager to show that he could run the ship at a lesser cost than his competitor.

In order to protect the Ship Manager’s source of income, which were based on a combination of ‘Management Fees’ and ‘Ship Operational costs’ + the cost of maintaining a ‘Crewing Centre’ in one of the Asian countries - which were (mostly) being invoiced to the Owner - most Management companies, quite a few of them fly-by-night companies, resorted to cutting corners on operational maintenance to varying degrees.

This resulted in decreasing maintenance activity and increasing failures on board the ship, due to which accidents became more common.

Even the wages paid to the Asian crew became an element of intense scrutiny in Management circles. Increase in wages to the Asian seafarer was kept in abeyance for many years, the reasoning being that the currency exchange rate vis-a-vis the US Dollar in that particular country had increased, so eventually the seafarer’s pay check - in his own country’s currency - had increased steadily and significantly due to the exchange rate. So, they opined, there was no need to increase wages.

Thus, 30 to 40% of the world’s fleet was deteriorating fast and shipping accidents were on the rise.

Stricter Safety controls needed to be implemented before more accidents happen.

Industrial establishments ashore had already implemented various Safety and Quality standards, such as ISO 9000, 14000 and their several offshoots, OSHA and other world wide standards.

The Maritime industry was far behind in this aspect.

The STCW (Standards of Training, Certification and Watch Keeping) articles that came into effect in 1984, was probably the first acknowledgement of a changing scenario in the Maritime Industry. These articles targeted all seafarers worldwide, with certain guidelines and minimum criteria in aspects of

Training -

Pre sea training

in various Maritime Institutes that had been recognised by the Shipping Ministry of that country

Post sea training

after qualifying for examinations of each rank

Compulsory courses in

Fire Fighting, Basic, Advanced

Life Boat and Life Saving courses

First Aid Courses

Tanker Safety Courses, Basic and Advanced for those going on Tankers.

Advanced courses for different ‘liquid’ and ‘gas’ cargoes

Bridge Simulator Courses

Engine Simulator courses

Upgrading of Competency Certificates on a regular basis

Etc

While the first five were introduced in the 1980s, the others came into vogue end 1990s and later.

The fallout was that the seafarer found himself spending more than 50% of his leave time attending courses, updating his certificates.

Certification -

Between 1970 and 2020, the rules, regulations, knowledge content and method of preparation for various Certificates of Competency has undergone a brutal change.

The seafarer who obtained his Certificates of Competency in the 1970s or earlier, will no longer be able to identify himself with the course structure or the preparation needed to obtain the COC of this day.

Example of what they study in class

Below is a small example of what an Engineer appearing for his Class 2 Certificate needs to be thorough with. He is lectured on this during several 2 hour sessions at the Institute which he has to mandatorily join.

Any question on these topics can either be asked during the written examination or during the Orals, in differing details.

Knowledge of relevant international maritime laws embodied in international agreements and conventions: Explain UNCLOS,IMO, WHO, ILO, Define Conventions, Treaties, Protocols, rules and regulations, List IMO Conventions & Authorities & Regulations. List certificates and other documents to be carried on board ships by International conventions (as per SOLAS Annex 1).

Explain how they may be obtained and period of their legal validity.

20 or more such sessions are on Regulations alone.

He has to spend a total of 250 hours in these sessions, less than 50 of them related to Engineering Knowledge.

In my opinion, he will not even use 5% of the knowledge of the regulations he has crammed for, in practical situations on board.

Even the Engineering Knowledge lectures are about the latest technological advancements of that time, on which he is tested.

How many of us, in a career spanning 2 or more decades, have had the opportunity to sail on ships with, say, a new steering fin design with “Enhanced Reversing Bucket” technology? Or “Water Jet Propulsion”? Or “Contra rotating propellers”? Or “Wake Equalising Ducts System of Propulsion”? Or “Cavity System of Propulsion”? Or ‘Pod’ Propulsion system, where rudders become redundant? Or “Ecological Tribo Technologies” and "Tribology”?

(I looked the last one up - it means “the study of friction, wear, lubrication, and the design of bearings; the science of interacting surfaces in relative motion”. Whew, now I understand - CC Pounder gives a lot of details).

How relevant will this knowledge be?

The exotic few mentioned above may be just the prototypes or still in the experimental stage. But the years 2000 to 2020, two decades, have seen a quantum leap in the design modifications made to Main Engines, ancillary systems and Bridge Equipment, the Bridge being the larger beneficiary.

The Bridges of recent ships do not have any relationship, in technological terms or in terms of aesthetics, to any and all of their forefathers of a couple of decades ago.

All three courtesy dreamtime.com

The last three decades has seen a stupendous leap in the configuration and use of technology as far as Bridge equipment went.

The change from analog to digital technology gave the needed impetus to manufacturers in innovative designs that were far smaller in size and had a wider outreach and range than before.

Celestial navigation gave way to GPS.

Paper charts were made obsolete by electronic ones that get automatically updated through satellite internet connections.

The rapid change in innovative Bridge technology saw a confusion in the ranks of Bridge watch keepers as they were not familiar with, and could not keep up with, the fast changing Bridge.

Upgradation courses for the seniors and mandatory introduction of simulator courses for those who were going for their Certificates, brought all quickly to the knowledge base required.

In contrast, the Engine Room technological strides were restricted to certain innovations on the upper part of the Main Engine.

Certainly, the change from ‘analog’ to ‘digital’ had a huge impact. Main Circuit Boards or ‘Printed Circuit Boards’ - now called ‘Motherboards’ - were large in size and many in number, taking up a lot of space. With ‘digitalisation’ and ‘miniaturisation’ came economy in the price of components, making it possible to monitor hundreds of parameters.

Side by side, the path ran to ‘Unmanned Machinery Spaces’, with the sad inevitability of a sharp reduction in the number of personnel working in an Engine Room.

Essentially, the main components of the Main Engine have remained the same for a century, with only minor design changes. Major changes were evident in the structure of the components, as metallurgical advancements accelerated.

The innovations were, mostly, restricted to the means of delivery of fuel to the engine. The change from standard delivery of fuel to the engine to using hydraulics and electronics to time the delivery of fuel - ‘Common Rail System’ for one - created more complications for the Engineer than were solved, more due to lack of training than anything else.

These were quickly addressed in mandatory ‘Upgradation Courses’ in most countries.

At the present time, a few institutions offer (non-mandatory) courses to interested personnel on the latest innovations.

For example, ‘The Institute of Marine Engineers India’ offer short term value added courses on subjects such as

1. Introduction to ME Engine

2. Hydraulic Power Supply (HPS)

3. Hydraulic Cylinder Unit (HCU)

4. Engine Control System (ECS)

5. Main Operating Panel (MOP)

6. Standard Operation

7. Difference between ME-C and ME-B type. (camless and light cam)

8. Adjustments of Cylinder oil, Exhaust Valve and Fuel Injection parameters.

Step by step vessel operation from dead ship to full away, utilizing the main operating panel

Electronic Engine Familiarization Course (ME-Type Engine) – 3 days Course (Online)

Familiarisation Training Course For Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Tanker Operations

(Online)

I wish these kind of value added courses had been offered during the years I sailed. I needed them.

ISO 9000 - ISM CODE - SMS

Along came ISO 9000 from which grew the ISM Code, forcing all establishments to subject themselves to an External Audit to obtain approval Certification.

The basic intent of ISO 9000 was to improve quality and maintain high standards within the Organisation.

For example - procurement of spare parts. Buying from spurious sources may cut the price tag by 50% of what the original equipment costs. But the quality of operation reduces and failure rates become higher.

ISO 9000 enjoins the buying of spare parts from authorised vendors and, of late, directly from the original manufacturer, especially critical spares.

ISO 9000 mandates the use of authorised workshops to carry out repairs and other work on board.

This ‘authorisation’ normally comes from Classification Societies.

A classic example of going to the cheapest vendor for the performance of a service is given here.

A ship’s CO2 Fire Extinguishing (total flooding) system (Kidde’s) was overdue for a five yearly check and certification.

Normally, this job is contracted out to well known companies like ‘Kidde’, Unitor and such. They are expensive, but they do a perfect job and do not endanger people.

A cost cutting Superintendent decided to, well, cut costs. He contacted a Fire Brigade unit in a small town, where the ship would be berthed for a few days and asked them to carry out the complete servicing of the ship’s CO2 system, paying them about 1/3rd the sum that he would have paid to ‘Unitor’.

They stated that they knew what to do and agreed.

When the Chief Engineer saw their approach to the job, he understood that they had no experience to carry out the servicing. He sent a message to the Office and also called them up to let them know his apprehensions.

The Superintendent was firm that the Fire Brigade were capable enough and knew their job.

2 hours later, the entire set of 120 CO2 cylinders operated and all the CO2 released itself into the Engine Room. All Engine Room personnel had to scramble out of the Engine Room. Fortunately, no one was killed.

There was an investigation by the US Coast Guard. Their report strongly stated that the local Fire Brigade were not authorised or certified for this job. Furthermore, they had no prior experience for the job. They blamed the Company for contracting the job to an unauthorised vendor.

The Superintendent blamed the Chief Engineer by saying that he did not provide proper supervision.

The Chief Engineer copied the message of his objections to all concerned, added his resignation and walked out.

The ship was stuck in that port for several days. They had to get a dispensation to sail to a port where CO2 (in bulk) was available for filling 120 cylinders.

(The above incident is an actual account related to me.)

With the implementation of ISO 9000 standards, as interpreted by the marine industry in the form of the ISM Code, all such idiotic decisions had to be shelved.

The International Safety Management Code, ISM Code, grew out of the articles of ISO 9000.

SOLAS came into existence after the Titanic disaster and its unregulated, uncontrolled, uncertified building and safety standards, with each shipyard and shipowner deciding for themselves what level and standards of safety they should introduce into the ship. Economics was the only decider.

Once SOLAS was introduced in 1914, standards were established without regard to the costs. Conventions held at regular intervals brought about more and more stringent conditions to existing laws as well as the introduction of new avenues in safety and construction.

But what SOLAS and MARPOL failed to achieve was standards of quality - quality in manpower, quality in material, quality in Management.

It was left to the Shipowner, if he so desired, to skirt the regulations of SOLAS and MARPOL and pay the barest heed to regulations, just enough to obtain the necessary certification.

So a substandard ship comes into existence, slowly and unobtrusively becoming a lethal time bomb as it deteriorates more and more in safety standards and hull quality.

Bulk Carriers’ accidents, mainly sinkings and explosions, are a proof of such substandard constructions, prior the 1990s.

Ferry accidents are another example.

===== Same Subject Continued in Blog 111 =====